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THE MARKET AS A PROPERTY
INSTITUTION: RULES FOR THE TRADING
OF FINANCIAL ASSETSt
DAVID E. VAN ZANDT*
Could it be that the market suffers from the defects of com-
munal property rights in organizing and influencing uses of
valuable resources?'
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of the "market" is extremely powerful in both eco-
nomics and social theory. 2 The "textbook" approach posits that the
market adjusts between supply and demand for an asset by setting
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Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.
EGON. REV. 777, 795 (1973).
See Beja & Hakansson, From Orders to Trades: Some Alternative Market Mechanisms, in
IMPENDING CHANGES FOR SECURITIES MARKETS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EXCHANGES? 144 (E.
Bloch & R. Schwartz eds. 1979). "Of all the edifices built by economists, the competitive
market model stands as the tallest and the most elegant. It is a monument to efficiency,
decentralization, economy of communication and, if you will, trader sovereignty." Id.
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the clearing prices In this process, individual traders free of gov-
ernment regulation voluntarily bid to buy and offer to sell that
asset. 4 There are no externally imposed requirements that require
certain bids and offers, or that dictate the means of exchange. The
emphasis is on factors that result in an equilibrium price, no matter
how fleeting. 5 While this description is not incorrect, it hides much
of the complexity of markets. What Alchian and Demesetz have
said about the idea of the firm is equally applicable to the market:
"The term . . . [market] as commonly used is so turgid of meaning
that we can not hope to explain every entity to which the name is
attached in common or even technical literature." 6
Of all the real world markets, the markets for the secondary
trading of financial assets seem most accurately to reflect this ideal
description. On first glance and in the popular imagination, these
markets in which large sums change hands at breakneck speed are
the epitome of the free market: they consist of helter-skelter trading
driven only by the avariciousness of the individual participants.?
See id. The following is one textbook definition of "market": "The central institution
through which a laissez-faire system answers the basic questions [of allocation and distribu-
tion] is the market, a term that is used in economics to signify an institution through which
buyers and sellers interact and engage in exchange." K. CASE & R. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF
EcoNomics 43 (1989).
4 Markets are usually thought of as the antithesis of government regulation, a miscon-
ception I seek to correct. See, e.g., K. CASE & R. FAIR, supra note 3, at 42-43.
5
 Beja & Hakansson, supra note 2, at 145.
6 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 785.
7
 Everyday, over $640 billion worth of currencies is traded in the foreign exchange
markets throughout the world, a volume that is thirty-two times greater than the daily world
trade in goods and services. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, MONETARY AND ECO-
NOMIC DEPARTMENT, SURVEY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ACTIVITY 2 (1990) (figures as
of April 1989). Of the world trade in currency, 58% is spot market transactions, 40% consists
of forward transactions (both exchange traded futures contracts and negotiated forward
contracts) and 2% involves option trading. Id. at 5. The analogous number for transactions
in United States Treasury securities is $113 billion a day in straight trading and over $776
billion per day in repurchase agreement contracts. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES: MORE TRANSACTION INFORMATION AND INVESTOR PROTECTION MEA-
SURES ARE NEEDED 2, 15 (Sept. 1990); see also The techno T-Bond market, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10,
1990, at 82, col. 1. On an average day on the New York Stock Exchange, over 150 million
shares of common stock and $38 million worth of corporate and governmental bonds are
exchanged. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, F, at 18 (New York Stock Exchange graph
shows average daily volume for week ended March 16, 1990 was 154,646,614 shares); N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1990, § F, at 21 (volume table based on par value shows average daily volume
for week ended March 16, 1990 was $38,340,600 of bonds). On the markets for financial
futures and options, the numbers are no less staggering. The number of Eurodollar futures
contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's International Monetary Market on
an average day is almost 140,000, with an underlying value of $140 billion. The volume
number for U.S. Treasury bond futures is 336,880, with an underlying value of $34 billion.
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The recent insider trading scandals, 8 commodity trading indict-
ments,g and journalistic and fictional accounts" all contribute to this
image of financial markets as arenas of unfettered freedom to pur-
sue pure self-interest.
A simple look beneath the surface of this image, or a quick
glance at the primary source of income for thousands of lawyers,
dispels that perception. Secondary markets in financial assets, in
fact, are highly structured and highly regulated. Individuals do not
simply get together and strike a deal in any haphazard fashion.
Each market has an established set of procedures that participants
follow to engage in trades, and those procedures vary radically from
market to market. Moreover, while we let anyone sell cars, clothing
and food—the staples of daily life—with only minimal supervision,"
individuals must register and meet strict capital requirements to
deal in many types of financial assets. Furthermore, traders must
conduct their business only in certain places, the governmentally
approved and regulated exchanges or markets. In many cases, the
very structure of certain transactions is determined by sets of rules
approved by government agencies.
Despite this, most legal commentary on these markets examines
boundary issues: should (and how should) investors be protected
from the asserted greed and avarice of participants in a free-wheel-
ing market. Articles concerning insider trading, 12 abuses in
the trading of commodities 13 and alleged abuses of "program
The number of German DM futures contracts traded on an average day is close to 50,500,
with an underlying value of DM6.3 billion, See N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, F, at 28.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Milken, 759 F: Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v.
Boesky, 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94, 417 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1989); Securities & Exch.
Comm'n v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10383 (S.D.N.Y. June 20,
1989).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Mosky, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6162 (N.D, Ill. 1990) (indict-
ment); United States v. Bailin, 731 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (indictment).
'" See, e.g., A. ALLETZHAUSER, THE HOUSE OF NOMURA (1990); R. CHERNOW, THE HOUSE
OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990); T.
WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1988).
II Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669, 670 (1984) (in contrast to federal regulation of securities fraud, there is no federal
regulation of quality of educational services offered).
12 See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton &
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV, 857 (1983); Haddock & Macey, A
Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1449 (1987).
13 See, e.g., Markham, Prohibited Floor Trading Activities Under the Commodity Exchange Act,
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1989); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHICAGO FUTURES MARKET:
INITIAL OBSERVATIONS ON TRADE PRACTICE ABUSES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, UNITED STATES SENATE (Mar. 1989); Hearing on
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trading"" debate whether investors need governmental protection
from the markets. While fraud at the boundary continues to be an
issue," there must be some justification other than investor or par-
ticipant protection for the massive regulatory enterprisel 6 that per-
meates all aspects of markets for financial assets.' 7
This article argues that these markets can be understood as
property systems.' 8 Property systems are collective devices that re-
duce the costs of holding and exchanging resources. In the standard
view of property systems,' 9 property entitlements in resources held
Intermarket Frontrunning and Other Financial Market Manipulations Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Futures Industry Investigation:
Hearings Before House Subcomm. on Conservation, Credit, and Rural Development of Comm. on
Agriculture, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
14 See, e.g., Symposium on the Regulation of Secondary Trading Markets: Program Trading,
Volatility, Portfolio Insurance, and the Role of Specialists and Market Makers, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
799 (1989); Program Trading: Hearing Before House Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin., Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Schick, A Review and Analysis of the Changing
Financial Environment and the Need for Regulatory Realignment, 44 Bus. LAW. 43 (1988).
15 The SEC pursues fraud on individual investors with some persistence, as its penny
stock investigations and initiatives indicate. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990); Sales Practice Re-
quirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 27,160, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) III 84,440. Investigations of commodities markets usually focus largely on
fraud on customers committed by floor traders acting in collusion. See supra note 9.
16 The most recent legislative effort is the Market Reform Act of 1990, which creates a
large trade reporting system, coordinates national efforts for a national dearance and settle-
ment system and provides for SEC monitoring of holding company structures of registered
broker-dealers. Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
17 Early work by economists on the mandatory disclosure system required by the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aaa (1988) [hereinafter "the Securities Act"l, concluded
that the system did not improve the level of investor welfare. In particular, they discovered
no evidence that the Securities Act reduced any significant level of losses caused by fraud.
See, e.g., Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964); Benston,
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973). Some authors have identified alternative justifications for man-
datory disclosure and for rule 10b-5, the federal securities fraud rule. See Easterbrook &
Fische!, supra note 11, at 696-700, 679-80; Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723-34 (1984); Gilson & Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 635-42 (1984); 17 C.F.R. 240.106-5
(1989).
1" Similarly, Macey and Kanda describe organized stock exchanges as firms producing
specific goods—liquidity, monitoring of issuers, off-the-rack corporate governance rules and
verification of asset quality—in an increasingly competitive environment. Macey & Kanda,
The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock
Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1010-24 (1990).
19 See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West,
18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. Econ. REV,
347 (1967); Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl
Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1986).
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in common are allocated to individuals and protected by society
when the benefits of that allocation exceed the costs of negotiating
and policing the allocation. This allocation permits the more effi-
cient use and conservation of the resource in question. More sig-
nificantly, property systems economize on the costs of transacting
by creating collective mechanisms either through private contract
or, more commonly, through government action. In the same way,
markets are collective mechanisms that permit participants to en-
gage in exchanges of assets more efficiently. In some cases, these
collective mechanisms may emerge spontaneously; other markets
may face obstacles than can only be overcome by the state's coercive
power.
Section II discusses the notion of "market" as an institutional
structure similar to the property system and the types of obstacles
to exchange that any market structure must address. The article
sets out the conditions for the emergence of collective mechanisms
that permit the market to economize on the costs of transacting.
Section III applies this analysis to five types of market structures
prevalent in secondary markets for financial assets. The article uses
as examples of these market structures the foreign exchange mar-
ket, the government securities market, the over-the-counter market
for equity securities, the Toronto and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, the
open outcry markets for futures and options, the NASDAQ and
International Stock Exchange computerized markets for equity as-
sets, and the American stock exchanges. Finally, Section IV argues
that government regulation of the structure of these markets—as
in property systems—is understandable as simply a collective mech-
anism that reduces costs where the number of market participants
is great.
II. FINANCIAL MARKETS AS PROPERTY SYSTEMS
Economic theories of private property have emphasized that
security in one's property is the essence of a property system. If
people know they are secure in their entitlements to resources, they
will have the greatest incentive to invest productively in those en-
titlements. 2° This requires both that the property cannot be taken
without their consent and that the bounds of their entitlements are
II} See Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 321-22
(1985); Rose, "Enough, and as Good" of What?, 81 Nw, U.L. REV. 417, 419 (1987).
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clear." Such systems give participants the needed incentives to pro-
duce new goods and conserve existing resources.
While security does improve the social efficiency of resource
use and allocation, equally important is the ability to freely transfer
the entitlement to the resource. 22 We are all better off if owners of
entitlements can transfer those entitlements in a "market" of some
type. In addition to providing reliable entitlements, a major (and
neglected) function of many rules in property law is to structure a
secondary market in assets that permits trading with the lowest
transaction costs. 23 Property systems exist largely to facilitate trade
in valuable assets, whether land or financial assets. Existing theories
of property systems, however, have paid no more attention to how
assets are actually exchanged than have the analyses of ideal mar-
kets."
A. The Demand for Trading of Financial Assets
In the case of financial assets, transferability is essential. Unlike
a tangible asset that can be consumed by the holder, such as land
or food, a financial asset is merely a claim on the issuer. 25 Thus, its
t' These are two crucial assumptions underlying the Coase theorem. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 311.. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coase theorem posits that when legal entitlements
are clear and secure and when bargaining is costless, bargaining will ensure that the entitle-
ments wind up in the hands of the persons who value them the most, thus maximizing social
welfare. The theorem's counterintuitive implication is that in a world of no transactions costs
it does not matter to social welfare to whom the law gives the initial entitlement. But see Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. Rev. 577 (1988) (discussing the social function
of entitlement determination rules that are unclear).
" The resource allocation effects of the Coase theorem critically depend on the ability
to transfer an entitlement in a world free of transaction costs. Coase, supra note 21, at 15.
" This aspect of property rules has received less attention. But see, e.g., Baird & Jackson,
Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1984); Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 17, at 643 n.247; T. Hall, A Reexamination of the Cartel Hypothesis
of Real Estate Brokerage Markets and the Multiple Listing Services (Sept, 1983) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
" Some attention has been paid to the structure of organized futures markets. Telser
argues that organized futures markets exist because futures contracts, like money, act "as a
temporary abode of purchasing power." Telser, Why There are Organized Futures Markets, 24
& ECON. I, 12 (1981). Williams theorizes that such markets exist because transaction
costs in futures are less than the costs of equivalent transactions in the spot market. Williams,
Futures Markets: A Consequence of Risk Aversion or Transactions Costs!, 95 J. Pot.. ECON. 1000,
1018 (1987). The futures markets provide a form of cheap intermediation. Id, at 1020. These
explanations are specific to futures contract trading because they depend on the nature of
the future contract; they shed little light on the trading of other financial assets.
" A financial asset is a legal instrument or contract pursuant to which the holder obtains
a right to a specified stream of payments of value from the issuer. J. Donohue & D. Van
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value depends on the issuer's future ability and willingness to per-
form. While investors theoretically could hold assets issued to them
to maturity, the rate of return that they would demand is so high
that it would seriously reduce the volume of capital that could be
raised for productive projects. This is because only a very small
number of investors are able to evaluate and bear the risk of default
over the entire life of the asset. 26
When such an asset is easily transferable, however, the return
demanded by an investor is lower.27 Investors know they can shift
out of an asset, albeit at a loss, if the risk of issuer default becomes
too great. Similarly, and irrespective of the issuer's condition, inves-
tors know that they can sell the asset if they decide to alter their
portfolios because of changes in their risk preferences, or in the
characteristics of other assets in their portfolios. Investors will accept
a "liquidity discount" for the ability to transfer an asset freely. 28 If
assets are freely transferable, the demand for such assets (and the
price paid for them) will be higher, other things being equal, than
for a less easily transferable asset. To the extent that a market can
provide this possibility to investors cost effectively, we are all better
off. 29 Although the purpose of financial markets is often said to be
the efficient allocation of capital, that purpose is only derivative in
Zandt, Models of Deregulation in International Capital Markets 3 ( Jan. 7, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author). The basis of the payments can be a set percentage of a
principal amount ("interest") plus that principal amount (together, "debt") or it can be a
specified share of the residual profits of the issuer (a "dividend") plus a share of the proceeds
upon dissolution (together, "equity"). This definition includes contracts to purchase such a
claim in the future ("forward" or "future") and contracts granting the purchaser the option
to buy or sell such a claim in the future ("option").
" Bank loans, historically, have been financial assets that are held to maturity. Recently,
however, the size of the bank loan market has grown, coincident with the emergence of a
secondary market in such loans. See London, Secretive market set to enter the spotlight, Fin. Times,
Sept. 26, 1990.
27 Haddock & Macey, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985
U. ILL, L. REV. 315, 317.
2° See J. INGERSOLL, THEORY OF FINANCIAL DEGISIONMAKING 402 (1987); R. BREALEY &
S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 558 (3d ed. 1988).
" This, of course, is an overstatement. There are situations in which we would be better
off if holders of entitlements cannot transfer them. This is so when transfers result in
substantial externalities, informational asymmetries and coordination (or common pool)
problems. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L, REV. 1089, 1111 (1972); Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85
Coins+. L. REV. 970, 973-88 (1985); Rose-Ackerman, inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 938-40 (1985). There may also be independent distributional
concerns that justify inalienability rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1114-15; Raclin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 961-65.
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these markets." The immediate purpose of a market is the reduc-
tion in the cost of transfers.
B. The Collective Provision of Transferability
Markets reduce costs in different ways. Again, an analogy to
property systems is useful. While each member of society acting
individually could capture and protect resources from physical ap-
propriation by others, property systems are collective efforts that
provide such security at less individual cost. Instead of arming
oneself, each member of society can call on a third party to protect
his or her interest. In the same way, financial markets are institu-
tions that reduce certain costs of transferring financial assets by
providing a service collectively, rather than letting participants pro-
vide that service individually.3 '
Two parties to a transaction can always organize their trans-
action to reduce the costs of transacting to the optimum. For ex-
ample, buyers and sellers of a good may allocate between themselves
the costs of assuring the quality of the good by allocating the risk
that quality may deviate from some agreed upon level. 32 To refer
to such arrangements as constituting a "market," however, is to
reduce the term to the equivalent of "contract." Instead, markets
are a form of "team production" in which two or more individuals,
by pooling their efforts, are better off than they would be working
individually.33 Markets are defined by their use of collective mech-
30
 By definition, the financial assets traded in these secondary markets have already
been issued by the issuer, and the issuer has previously received the funds it will put to
productive purposes. When the price of a financial asset dips in the secondary market, the
issuer does not suffer and there is no net change in the actual capital being employed in the
issuer's enterprise. The secondary market price, however, is important to the issuer because
it suggests the price at which the issuer could raise additional capital. Moreover, if potential
investors know that they can quickly liquidate a financial asset, they will be more likely to
purchase that asset in the future.
II See Steiner, The Public Sector and the Public Interest, in STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMY
IN GOVERNMENT, Jr. ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 1 THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PP13 SYSTEM 13,14 (Jt. Comm. Print 1969).
22 Product warranties perform this function, and can be explained as a bilateral econ-
omization of the costs of quality assurance. See Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty,
90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307-19 (1981) (allocation of insurance and repair responsibility between
consumer and manufacturer).
33
 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note I, at 779 ("Itleam production will be used if it yields
an output enough larger than the sum of separable production of Z to cover the costs of
organizing and disciplining team members"). Alchian and Demsetz use the concept of team
production to distinguish "firms" from "markets." My point is that actual markets are social
institutions more similar to the economists' "firm" than the economists' "market." For this
discussion, the firm's key characteristic is the collective provision of transaction cost reduction,
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anisms in which third parties are enticed, by private incentives or
public force, 34 to provide services to reduce the transaction costs
borne by the parties to the transaction.
Just as private property regimes arise when sufficient demand
exists for a collective mechanism to secure entitlements, secondary
markets for financial assets emerge when the collective provision of
services for transferability are cost effective. For this to occur, the
benefits of the system must exceed the costs of establishing and
policing the system. In the case of private property systems, such
costs include those incurred in obtaining substantial agreement
from the members of society to abide by rules requiring the respect
of asset ownership, and in the provision of police or other mecha-
nisms to monitor and enforce compliance with the rules. The prob-
lem is no different in the establishment and administration of mar-
kets. The particular method used by a market to address these
obstacles, of course, may generate costs of its own. The important
question is not whether there exists a "free market" for a particular
asset, but whether the particular market structure "appropriately
economize[s]" on the costs of secondary trading."
Markets differ widely in the way they actually put buyers and
sellers together because each type of transfer poses different obsta-
cles to easy trading. The structure of a particular market is deter-
mined by how it overcomes, avoids or accepts these obstacles to
trading. To take a simple, nonfinancial example, a college student
wishing to purchase used furniture and other room furnishings
could approach every departing senior to see if they might be willing
to sell these assets. A less costly solution, however, has developed.
The student knows that he can review a collection of "for sale"
advertisements posted on a campus bulletin board by potential sell-
ers. In this example, the market has an institutional structure that
is more centralized than one in which each potential buyer individ-
ually seeks out each potential seller. Because there is no coercive
requirement that buyers and sellers conduct transactions in this way,
a characteristic identified by Ronald Coase in his classic article on the firm. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 EC0NOM1CA 586, 392 (1937).
" Gilson and Kraakman use the term "collective" to refer only to governmental provision
of the mechanism. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 605, 638. I will later distinguish
between private and public provision of the collective mechanism.
" See Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 33-34 (1968). "None of this
makes unimportant the usual questions concerning the role of government in the resolution
of externality and monopoly problems. For there are cases in which the cost of government
action is less than the cost of transacting in markets." Id.
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this practice exists presumably because it is less costly to both buyers
and sellers to conduct exchanges through such a bulletin board."
The bulletin board is a collective device that economizes on the costs
of asset transference.
C. The Costs of Transferability for Financial Assets
Trading financial assets involves numerous costs, and for a
trade to occur the benefits of the trade must exceed the costs of
conducting it. One obstacle that a financial asset transaction does
not face, however, is the problem of unique assets." Real estate is
the epitome of a unique asset: buildings and land plots come in all
sizes and shapes, and each real estate package has its own configu-
ration of qualities. 38 Moreover, these qualities do not lend them-
selves to measurement on a one- or two-dimensional scale. There-
fore, a person wishing to purchase a real estate package must spend
considerable time and effort in determining whether a particular
package has the qualities that the purchaser desires.39 In contrast,
one financial asset is fully substitutable with another of the same
type issued by the same issuer." In order to capture the benefits of
transferability, issuers generally issue financial assets of identical
characteristics.
There are, however, a whole set of other obstacles, affecting
transferrability of financial assets, that a market might seek to re-
duce. In considering these costs, the relevant event is the transaction
itself, rather than the number or price of the financial assets traded
56 Of course, the university may subsidize this collective mechanism by providing the
board and cleaning off stale.notices periodically. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying
text (public versus private provision of collective mechanism).
" When the assets in a market are unique, there is, in effect, a "thin market." The thin
market occurs because of the small number of transactors and transactions for each unique
asset. Bargaining costs become important in thin markets because of bilateral monopoly
problems, Set Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. Rev. 701, 706 (1987).
MI See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 643 n.247.
'9 This assumes that the qualities are readily observable and that such packages are not
"experience goods." Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pot- Econr. 311 (1970).
An experience good is a good whose quality is ascertainable only by using it. Obviously, for
many of its qualities, a house is the quintessential experience good. The fact, however, that
each package has a unique configuration of qualities makes it difficult for a collective mech-
anism to emerge to economize on quality determination costs. We do not see reports for real
estate packages in Consumer Reports in the same way we do for other experience goods such
as refrigerators and washing machines.
4° Cf. Telser & Higinbotham, Organized Futures Markets: Costs and Benefits, 85 J. Pot-
EcoN. 969, 971 {1977) (standard contracts are necessary feature of organized futures market).
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in the transaction. The costs of a transaction in which 100 shares
of stock are transferred vary little from the costs of a transaction in
which 10,000 shares are transferred.'" Regardless of size, each trans-
action imposes a set of costs that a particular market structure can
seek to reduce.
1. Information Search Costs
Lack of information is probably the most significant obstacle to
trading. Informational asymmetries between traders of assets are
endemic to the real world. 42 In some cases, the party with the
information is more than willing to divulge without charge that
information to a potential counterparty, but cannot do so cheaply.
In other situations, one party requires a concession to reveal infor-
mation to a counterparty. Overcoming asymmetries of either type
is not costless."
In order to transact, a purchaser must find a counterparty who
holds the desired asset." While potential counterparties in most
cases would not exact a price for divulging their location, they are
often geographically disperse and thus costly to locate. In most
markets for goods, each individual must expend significant time
and resources to discover who holds the desired good. For example,
if I wish to purchase a particular type of used car, I must search
out sellers by any possible means. Often the time-value of my labor
in this search is a significant percentage of the total value of the car
I ultimately purchase. If the potential counterparties are widely
dispersed, this cost is increased.
Many markets, however, have developed collective devices for
reducing counterparty search costs. The basic technique is to reduce
the geographical dispersion of possible counterparties. In the above
example, the existence of car dealers willing to hold an inventory
41 The declining commissions charged for larger size trades substantiate this point. H.
STOLL, REGULATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED
COMPETITION 47 (1979) (table 7). That commissions are not identical for all trade sizes reveals
some residual marginal costs. For example, security and settlement costs are higher for larger
trades. More importantly, fees from large transactions probably still subsidize smaller trans-
actions.
42 Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Ass. ECON. REV. 519, 525 (1945).
" Stigler, The Economics of Information, 66 J. Pot_ ECON. 213 (1961), reprinted in G.
STILLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171 (1970).
" A related and significant cost of transfer is title verification: do the counterparties
actually own the assets they apparently hold? See Baird & Jackson, supra note 23 at 302-05.
In the case of financial assets, collective settlement mechanisms reduce this cost.
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of used cars reduces the number of places I must look." Newspa-
pers also help economize on such costs by providing a special section
of used car ads, which performs a function similar to the furniture
billboard on the college campus. Finally, friends collect and share
information that I can use regarding sellers of used cars. Many
markets provide a "call auction":" a centralized place and time
where buyers and sellers come to trade the asset in question.
Assuming a possible counterparty is found, a prospective buyer
must determine whether the asset has the desired qualities. 47 This
determination is difficult because the seller has an incentive not to
disclose adverse information about asset quality. Moreover, the
search for such information is more or less costly depending on the
nature of the asset. While a house can have all sorts of latent
defects—for example, the ubiquitous termite problem—and be ex-
posed to nonobvious nuisances, the quality of other assets is more
readily observable." Prospective purchasers can easily observe many
of the characteristics of financial assets, such as the principal
amount, stated interest rate, voting rights and maturity. Others,
such as yield, are easily calculable given knowledge of the asset's
market price.
Other significant traits, however, are more difficult to deter-
mine. For example, the likelihood of the timely payment of interest
and principal or of the level of future dividends is more difficult to
assess. Another significant risk in many financial asset trades is that
one party has relevant information, which the other party lacks,
about the asset issuer. The costs of determining these attributes
vary significantly depending on the type of financial asset. Infor-
mation concerning the quality of different foreign currencies is
readily available in daily newspapers. With slightly more effort, and
some research, a buyer can form a reasonable conclusion about the
likelihood of a private issuer defaulting on a bond. The research
costs to determine the quality of common stock and similar equity
assets, however, can be substantial.
45 See Stigler, supra note 43, at 176.
46 See Whitcomb, An International Comparison of Stock Exchange Trading Structures, in
MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 237,241-42
(1985).
47 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 594 (costs of acquiring, of processing and
of verifying information).
48 See Nelson, supra note 39, at 312-21 (comparison of experience goods with search
goods whose traits can be determined prior to purchase).
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Transactors have a variety of individual techniques at their
disposal to reduce the costs of determining asset quality.49 Many
markets, however, provide collective mechanisms to perform this
service. Third party certification is the ubiquitous example: the
Good Housekeeping seal of approval or the Underwriters Labora-
tory certification ensure consumers that they are purchasing assets
of a certain quality. Performing a similar function for financial
assets, credit-rating agencies, such as Standard and Poors and
Moody's, grade bonds and other debt instruments. For a fee, market
professionals uncover information about private equity securities. 5°
At times, governments provide such collective mechanisms for de-
termining asset quality. For example, the Department of Agricul-
ture certifies meat quality. Another government agency, the Food
and Drug Administration, certifies the safety and effectiveness of
medicines and food additives. Similarly, in some markets for finan-
cial assets, the government mandates disclosure of information
about securities. In all these cases, instead of determining asset
quality personally, the buyer relies on third party certification to
save costs.
Assuming purchasers know the quality of an asset, they will still
incur costs in searching for the best price." If search costs for this
type of information are too high, it is likely that transactions for
identical assets will occur simultaneously at different prices. Even if
the mean price of these simultaneous transactions is the market
clearing price, there could still be a wide dispersion of the prices at
which trades occur. 52 This might result in local, if temporary, "pock-
ets of glut and shortage existing side by side."" Although such a
state of affairs is not bad per se, individual buyers want to avoid
trades at prices exceeding the mean, and thus those buyers have an
incentive to engage in costly search behavior.
A potentially desirable solution to this problem would be the
centralized publication of offers, bids and transaction price infor-
49 See Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 27, 32-
37 (1982) (solution of measurement problem by use of warranties, share contracts, brand
names and suppression of information); Priest, supra note 32 (standard warranties are effi-
cient cost reduction devices in relationship between consumer and manufacturer).
5° Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 595-97.
u See K. COHEN, S. MAIER, R. SCHWARTZ & D. WHITCOMB, THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF
SECURITIES MARKETS 160-61 (1986); Stigler, supra note 93, at 174.
52 Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67
GEo. L.J. 1187, 1188, 1194-95 (1979).
" Id. at 1194.
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mation. If the buyer could see every price quotation being offered
at one point in time, and the price of every completed transaction
up to that point in time, the buyer would be able to select the best
price with certainty. 54 Moreover, if each price offerer could see the
prices being offered at the same time, the offerer could quickly
adjust his quotation to be more competitive and the range of prices
on offers to buy the asset would be reduced. In such a case, a buyer
could avoid price search costs because the quoted price is the best
one. This represents a collective mechanism. Potentially, some per-
son or organization could collect and disseminate such information
to market participants for a fee.
In many markets, including those for financial assets, price
search is an important way to save on the costs of asset quality
determination. 55 Price is often a reliable proxy for the quality of the
asset. 56 For example, an old VW Rabbit in good mechanical condi-
tion commands a higher price than a car of the same make and age
that has suffered a series of mechanical problems. Premiums on
particular brands are used as signals of higher quality even by
consumers unaware of the brand's reputation. 57 Relying on the
quoted price to reduce quality determination costs, however, is risky
unless the buyer has some assurance that the quoted price is near
the mean of the distribution of prices for the asset. 58 The collective
54 This is one of the justifications the Supreme Court used in 1918 to reject an antitrust
challenge to the Chicago Board of Trade's "call" rule. The rule prohibited members from
purchasing or offering to purchase, after the exchange had closed, any wheat, oats, corn or
rye that was already enroute to Chicago at a price other than the closing bid price. The
Court stated: "[The rule] created a public market for grain 'to arrive.' Before its adoption,
bids were made privately. Men had to buy and sell without adequate knowledge of actual
market conditions. This was disadvantageous to all concerned, but particularly so to country
dealers and farmers." Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240 (1918);
see also R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST LAW 175-76 (1981).
55 "The 'marvel' of the price system is its efficiency in communicating information in a
system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people."
McAfee & McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LITERATURE 699, 699 (1987) (quoting
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 525 (1945)).
" This is based on the idea that a relatively higher price is a signal of quality: signaling
"takes place when sellers of truly higher-quality products engage in some activity that would
not be rational for those selling lower-quality products." Hirshleifer & Riley, The Analytics of
Uncertainty and Information—An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1375, 1406 (1979).
Attempts by specific market participants to charge a higher price for lower-quality assets
would quickly be adjusted for by the market and be self-defeating.
" While brands help consumers economize on the cost of determining asset quality,
Barzel, supra note 49, at 35-37, the consumer must still investigate the general quality of the
brand. One way to do this is to rely on the brand's price premium to compare the brand's
general quality against other brands'.
58 See Garbade, Pomrenze & Silber, On the Information Content of Prices, 69 Ant. ECON.
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mechanism of a centralized quotation and trade publication service
provides this assurance. It presents to all market participants the
actual price distribution and accurately indicates asset quality.
This result accords with the semi-strong version of the efficient
market hypothesis: in a competitive market, the equilibrium price
should reflect all publicly available information on the quality of
the asset. 59 In a market in which there are frequent trades of large
numbers of identical assets, the previous or the currently quoted
price is often the most significant information to which a trader has
access.6° Traders can safely and cheaply form their expectations of
the true value of the asset by examining the price. 6 ' A collective
mechanism that centralizes firm bid and offer quotations is, not
surprisingly, a feature of a wide range of market structures. Its
success in providing this service depends on the percentage of
existing prices and transactions that are published. To the extent
that any prices and trades are hidden from the mechanism, the
collective mechanism's ability to economize declines.
Closely related to price search cost is timing search cost. For
example, I may be able to identify an appropriate counterparty who
has the entitlement to the asset I seek, but that person may not be
ready to offer the asset to me in the current time period. 62 That is,
she is not ready to sell the asset to me now, even if she might do so
REV. 50,58 (1979) (when observed price dispersion is more compact, government securities
dealers revise estimate of equilibrium price toward mean).
59 A major objective of any, market is the discovery of the "efficient price," that is, the
price at which buyers and sellers hold their optimal portfolio of assets, such portfolio reflect-
ing their beliefs about the risk and return characteristics of each asset in that portfolio.
Schreiber & Schwartz, Efficient Price Discovery in a Securities Market: The Objective of a Trading
System, in MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 25
(1985); see Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383 (1970).
69 See Garbade, Potnrenze & Silber, supra note 58, at 56-58 (mean price contains some
but not all asset quality information); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 572-79 (trading
informed by information derived from prices); Hayek, supra note 42, at 526-28 (traders
learn from prices).
51 Knowing who is in the market for an asset provides valuable information to other
traders. "Trade decoding occurs whenever uninformed traders glean trading information
by directly observing the transactions of informed traders .. [Un]informed traders use
the identities of large sellers to deduce whether the latter are likely to possess valuable
information." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 573-74; see also Scholes, The Market for
Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information an Share Prices, 45 J.
Bus. 179,184 (1972).
62 Harold Demsetz describes this as the immediacy problem. Demsetz, supra note 35, at
36. Others, using different models, refer to the "liquidity" problem. R. SCHWARTZ & D.
WHITCOMB, TRANSACTION COSTS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR TRADING STRATEGIES 45-46
(1988).
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at some point in the future.° Suppose I decide that I would like to
buy an Edward Hopper painting (which one is unimportant) for
the living room wall in my new addition. I may be able to identify
all of the persons who own an asset fitting that description, but it
may be that none of them is ready to sell their painting right now.
If I wait, I know that such an asset will come on the market sooner
or later, but waiting is costly to me: during the wait, I am not able
to satisfy my desire for a Hopper. Differing preferences about when
to transact cause markets to suffer from asynchronicity. 64 This
means that, at different points in time, there may be a temporary
excess of demand or supply for an asset.
A prominent collective mechanism used in most markets to
bridge these periods of temporary excess is the dealer (or the "mar-
ket maker"). 65 The dealer holds an inventory of the asset and stands
ready to buy or sell that asset to any comers. 66 For this service, the
dealer charges a fee that is reflected in the "spread": 67 the difference
between the "bid," the price at which the dealer is willing to pur-
chase the asset, and the "offer," the price at which he is willing to
sell the asset." In the above example of the Hopper, I could ap-
" Of course, a counterparty will have some "price" at which the counterparty will part
with the asset. That price, however, for a given counterparty may be at the extreme right
tail of the dispersion of offers. For example, a counterparty may be unwilling to breakup a
portfolio of assets by selling the one desired by another counterparty. A counterparty's
reluctance to sell is sometimes attributed to the "convenience yield": the return from holding
an asset not attributable to expected increases in its value. Telser, Futures Trading and the
Storage of Cotton and Wheat, 661 Pot.. ECON. 233, 235 (1958). The convenience yield may
include the costs associated with immediately replacing the asset if it were sold.
64 See Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb, Market Makers and the Market Spread: A
Review of Recent Literature, 14 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANAL. 813, 823 (1979); Demsetz, supra note
35, at 35; Grossman & Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J. FIN. 617, 622 (1988); Stoll,
Alternative Views Of Market Making, in MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY 79 (1985).
65 Brokers, in contrast, solve the counterparty problem, but not the timing problem.
Brokers undertake to search for an appropriate counterparty, but do not underwrite the
transaction itself.
66
 In addition to reducing timing costs, the finance literature identifies two other func-
tions of market makers: they assist in reducing price search costs by contributing to efficient
price discovery, and they provide some price stabilization. See R. ScHwAttrz & D. WHITCOMB,
TRANSACTION COSTS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR TRADING STRATEGIES 43-44 (1988).
67
 The spread is not a precise measure of the dealer's revenue because bid and offer
prices change over time depending on supply and demand conditions. See Stoll, The Supply
of Dealer Services in Securities Markets, 331 FIN. 1133, 1142-44 (1978). Thus, an asset bought
at the bid price at t, will be sold from the inventory at the offer price at which could
be above, below or equal to the bid at It, resulting in the dealer enjoying a gross profit, gross
loss or breaking even on that asset. In other words, the dealer's spread does riot represent
an arbitrage profit. See Grossman & Miller, supra note .64, at 628.
" One study suggests that the spread consists of 10% inventory holding costs, 43% risk
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proach an art dealer who has an inventory of Hoppers for sale.
The dealer has saved me the cost of solving the timing problem
myself. Banks, which are essentially dealers in money, perform the
same function. 69
2. Security Costs
Another cost of transacting—well discussed in the literature"—
is that of security, a cost endemic to all types of exchange. Very few
assets are contracted for and exchanged simultaneously. Even if I
have agreed to a purchase, I always run the risk that my counter-
party will default by not delivering the asset or the payment. Gen-
erally, in dispersed and completely unregulated markets, people
must develop some sort of bilateral mechanism to provide this
security. 7 ' It can be the taking of a "hostage," or collateral, that will
ensure the counterparty's performance. 72
The law of contract provides a collective mechanism to reduce
the costs to transactors of this obstacle to exchange. This mechanism
brings the power of the state to bear on those who might otherwise
breach their voluntarily assumed obligations to perform. Even with
a well-established regime of contract law, however, the possibility of
nonperformance still poses a security cost to the market, and parties
may still resort to private or bilateral means of reducing that cost.
For example, the counterparty can become bankrupt, and even if
it is not, enforcing contract rights is not costless; it is simply less
costly than most individual steps to ensure counterparty perfor-
mance.
Some markets provide additional collective mechanisms to re-
duce security costs. Banks, for example, frequently write letters of
credit to protect a seller of goods from a buyer's default. This is
particularly useful in the international sphere, when cross-border
enforcement of contract rights is more costly, if not impossible.
Issuers of credit cards perform the same function in consumer
from trading with better informed traders and 47% order processing costs. Stull, Inferring
the Components of the Did-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests, 441 FIN. 115, 132 (1989).
6° Cf. Williams, supra note 24, at 1019-20 (futures markets comparable to financial
intermediation provided by banks).
7° See, e.g., Telser, supra note 24, at 12; 'relser & Higinbotham, supra note 40, at 970.
7 ' See Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 12-18
(1985); Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 521-22 (1983).
72 See Williamson, supra note 71, at 522-26.
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transactions by assuring payment to a seller, even though the seller
does not know the credit worthiness of the counterparty.
3. Settlement Costs
Even if the counterparty fulfills its obligations, the parties must
still bear the simple cost of conducting the exchange. In many
contexts, this category of costs is called "closing costs." Real estate
closings are good examples. Title insurance must be purchased,
deeds drawn up, escrows for taxes created, and parties or their
agents must somehow meet to exchange the documents of title for
cash. In markets for financial assets, this is the cost of "settlement,"
where physical securities must be exchanged for cash. For years,
transactions in stocks and bonds were settled by hiring messengers
to transport certificates from one firm to another. While the costs
of such transactions within downtown Manhattan (although not
insubstantial) were bearable, transactions between more geograph-
ically distant holders of securities raised costs substantially.
While transacting parties might chose to bear these costs them-
selves, many markets have developed collective mechanisms for
reducing settlement costs. In the real estate market, title insurance
companies offer real estate closing services that handle many of the
mundane tasks of real estate transfers at lower cost than the parties
could on their own. Title recording statutes, in addition to verifying
ownership, reduce the costs of effectively transferring interests in
real estate." In the case of financial assets, the use of registered
securities and book-entry systems has reduced transaction settle-
ment costs substantially. 74 Instead of arranging for the physical
exchange of cash for certificates representing financial assets, these
systems simply record transfers of securities on a central book,
debiting and crediting accounts to reflect the cash transfer. 75
" See Baird & Jackson, supra note 23, at 304-05.
71 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS:
U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 106-25 (1990). Baird and Jackson
suggest that assets such as money are not suitable for a filing system because money is
transferred many times, and a possession rule has few disadvantages. Baird & Jackson, supra
note 23, at 306. Their focus is on the transfer of security interests, rather than on efficient
transfer of title itself. In many markets for financial assets, a filing system as a collective
mechanism has emerged because of the large number of transfers and the high cost of
physical delivery. The law recognizes this in Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
U.C.C. § 8-320,8-401 to 8-407 (system for transfer and pledge of securities).
75 The invention of money (whether issued by a private party or the government) is
another collective mechanism. This invention was a response to the high settlement costs of
barter or of gold exchange.
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D. The Emergence of Collective Mechanisms or Organized Markets
Even if a collective mechanism that reduces the costs of asset
transfer exists, however, it will not be adopted unless there is some
way to pay for it. First, the total cost of the mechanism must be less
than the total benefit it confers. In the same way that we would not
be willing to pay to parcel out property entitlements in only one
resource and to establish a police force to protect them, it would
not make much sense to use the New York Stock Exchange building
only to conduct transactions in the common stock of one company."
Property systems and the collective mechanisms that constitute an
organized market entail substantial fixed costs that can only be
justified if spread across a wide range of transactions. Second, some
way must exist to make the beneficiaries of the mechanism pay their
appropriate share of the cost. Even if the total benefit exceeds the
total cost, the fact that it is difficult or impossible to charge those
who benefit may prevent the mechanism from emerging. In prop-
erty systems, this latter problem is that of the "commons.""
I. Factors Leading to Collective Mechanisms
A collective mechanism will emerge only if the circumstances
of the market justify the cost. One factor that affects this calculation
is the nature of the assets being traded. For example, the market
for used furniture in a college town is more likely to take the form
of the previously described bulletin board than that of a central
trading floor, such as a vegetable market to which all sellers would
bring their wares. This is so because the furniture is fairly heavy,
and because any furniture a student would want is probably located
within walking distance of the campus. Neither of these is true for
fresh vegetables.
Likewise, financial assets differ in the way information about
the asset is acquired." For some financial assets, such information
78 On the opening day of the new Budapest Stock Exchange (observed by the author),
only one stock, that of the national tourism company, was traded. The Exchange occupied
one small windowless room and had six personal computers.
77 See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
78 Gilson and Kraakman analyze this factor by looking at the way that "news," or new
information relevant to the security, is initially distributed among traders. Gilson & Kraak-
man, supra note 17, at 567; see also Macey & Milker, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis
of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rev, 1059,1083-85 (1990) (different types of
information about assets have different consequences for market efficiency). This article
suggests that assets differ in how such initial information is distributed and that this difference
has important consequences for market structure.
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is easy to acquire at low cost. For example, the quality of government
securities is affected largely by information such as government
policy action in the debt markets and general economic indicators.
Collecting relevant quality information about other assets such as
private equity securities, however, is more costly. Other things being
equal, collective mechanisms are more likely when such information
costs are higher.
The demand for transactions in an asset affects the average
cost of the collective mechanism per transaction. Collective mecha-
nisms involve non-de minimis levels of fixed costs. The greater the
number of transactions, the lower the proportionate share of the
fixed cost that must be borne by each transaction. Continuing the
vegetable-furniture comparison, vegetables are goods that are
bought (and consumed) quite frequently by a given individual, while
furniture purchases are relatively rare. In the former case, the fixed
costs of a central market can be spread over a large number of
transactions, while in the latter, the infrequency of transactions does
not justify the maintenance of a central market. Thus, other things
being equal, collective mechanisms will emerge when the demand
for transactions is high.
Finally, the number of participants in a market will have a
significant impact on the ability of collective mechanisms to econo-
mize on transfer costs. For example, holding the number of trans-
actions constant, an increase in the number of participants makes
the reduction of all costs of transacting more difficult. Quality de-
termination in the vegetable market would be easier if the number
of growers is small because the parties then would be more likely
to have transacted with each other in the past and to have built up
a relationship of mutual trust or the ability to use "tit-for-tat" strat-
egies. Likewise, in a small group of transactors, the costs of price
search, settlement and security would be reduced by the same bi-
lateral mechanisms. With an increasing number of participants,
however, such costs for each trader will rise proportionately, and
collective mechanisms may be able to provide the same protections
at less individual cost. Other things being equal, as the number of
market participants increases, collective mechanisms become more
likely.
2. Commons Problems in Creating Markets
Even if the above factors suggest that a particular collective
mechanism is cost justified, there may still be an obstacle to the
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emergence of that mechanism that causes trading to occur at su-
boptimal levels. This reflects one of the resilient puzzles of the
standard property theory. Even assuming that the creation of a
private property system is socially beneficial, it is not clear from the
standard view how such a system emerged from the commons." In
that view, private property rights in the specific resource were dis-
tributed to individuals at some point because the former communal
organization of the resource led to its over-exploitation—the "trag-
edy of the commons." 8° That is, at some point, the social benefits
of the creation of a private property system, despite its social costs,
outweighed the net social benefits of the communal system. But the
very reason the tragedy of the commons existed in the first place
was that there was a disjunction between the private and social costs
of the system: each person acting in his self-interest had an incentive
to take all of a particular resource he could from the commons
without considering the social cost of such an act. While the tradi-
tional view explains why the system of private property is prefer-
able, it fails to discuss how we came to adopt it.
To understand this, it is useful to think of the classic commons
problem as one of the prisoners' dilemma. 8 ' Each member of society
would have an incentive to defect from an initial agreement to form
a private property system because his private expected net gain
from defection, the value of the resources he could acquire, is
greater regardless of whether others in society defect from or abide
by the agreement. All other members of society would reason sim-
ilarly,82 the result being that all would defect from the agreement
and thus perpetuate the socially less desirable communal system.
7° The same problem plagues the story of the emergence of the state itself in the
Hobbesian tradition. That tradition argues that individuals were better off with a sovereign,
but does not indicate how the sovereign might emerge. See M. DAVIS, GAME THEORY 113-14
(rev. ed. 1983) (Hobbesian account is prisoners' dilemma).
8° Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see also Demsetz, supra
note 19, at 354-55.
co The prisoners' dilemma is an important game structure within game theory. In the
standard version of it, the prosecutor has arrested two burglary suspects and isolated them
in separate rooms. He goes to each and offers the same deal: if you confess and your partner
also confesses, you both will receive five years in prison; if you confess and he does not, you
will go free and he will get ten years; if you do not confess and he does, you will get twenty
years and he will go free; and if you both do not confess, you both will get one year. M.
DAVIS, supra note 79, at 109. Because the partners in crime cannot reach an agreement with
each other, they both will fail to cooperate with each other by deciding to confess.
82 Even the presence of a substantial number of socially conscious altruists would not
affect the results. Their action would simply encourage those egoists who refused to coop-
erate.
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One answer to the dilemma of the emergence of the private
property system is that most resources are not subject to the pure
commons problem. That is, the payoff structure is not that of the
prisoners' dilemma. Instead, a particular resource might involve a
purely cooperative game. The payoff to each person who cooper-
ated with the new private property regime would be greater than
any gains to be gotten by refusing to cooperate. Umbeck's analysis
of the role of might in the distribution of property rights suggests
this situation.83 In the pre-property system state of nature, it is not
unreasonable to assume that all persons would have reasonably
equivalent private ability to capture a resource by force and protect
it from trespass. Given that assumption, 84 Umbeck demonstrates
that individuals would possess equal sized parcels of land of stan-
dard productivity.85
In that stable situation, a person would have no strong reason
to defect from an agreement to establish a private property system.
People would abide by the system because the standard size parcel
is the maximum payoff they could expect from not agreeing to the
system. Even if a person could grab more, acting alone that person
could not hold on to more than the standard size. 86 The person's
best strategy is to agree to join a society-wide cartel. Such a cartel
will produce a property system at an average cost to an individual
that is less than that individual's cost of private protection for the
property. The individual gives up nothing, therefore, by agreeing
to be subject to collective punishment for violating this social pact. 87
The problem becomes one of a simple cooperative game.88 Under
Umbeck, Might Makes Right: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property
Rights, 19 ECON. INQ. 38 (1981).
" Umbeck, supra note 83, at 42.
88 Umbeck, supra note 83, at 43-45.
" An alternative would be for the person to attempt to form a coalition with another
to increase the amount of land the person could hold. if there were no economies of scale
in the use of force, the person would be no better off. Cf. Umbeck, supra note 83, at 45-48
(contracting would result in same distribution of productive land). If there were economies
of scale, it is likely that any such coalition would be unstable. The coalition would be subject
to competing bids from other individuals who would try to lure the partner away by offering
a greater percentage of the land. See M. DAVIS, supra note 81, at 184-85; Bittlingmayer, The
Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute, 14 L. & Soc. INQ. 739,
747-50 (1989) (theory of empty core is idea that there is no stable equilibrium in such
situations).
87 Of course, once the pact is established, individuals have the incentive to avoid paying
their allocated share of the costs of the pact. But this is the standard problem that appears
in bilateral contracts of enforcement, and is unrelated to whether there is a collective action
problem that makes the creation of the pact impossible in the first place.
88
 Formally, a cooperative game is a non-zero sum game in which the individual payoffs
September 1991]	 TRADING FINANCIAL ASSETS	 989
these conditions, the emergence of a private property system simply
involves problems of coordination that entrepreneurs can easily
solve by providing a coordination service.
There may still be some resources, however, for which there is
no practical limit on the amount an individual may appropriate.
The standard examples, about which the "tragedy of the commons"
is concerned, are the use of air and water as waste dumping
grounds. In such situations, an individual's expected gain from
defecting from the property system would exceed the individual's
gain from complying. Thus, few people would be willing to sign on
to the system at the outset.
The only answer to the prisoner's dilemma problem, in these
situations, is to provide for the possibility of information transfers,
and retaliation for failures to cooperate. One way to do this is to
confront the individual with an existing structure that monitors and
punishes defections with substantial certainty. By doing this, the
commons problem is converted to the more tractable free rider, or
external benefits, problem. Still, such a structure is costly to create.
If it has to be created de novo, the commons problem will reassert
itself.
The simplest explanation for the emergence of such an insti-
tutional structure is that a structure already existed, one that was
originally created to address other concerns. if some cooperative
problem resulted in the creation of a monitoring and enforcement
apparatus, that apparatus might be adapted with less additional cost
to solve certain aspects of the commons problem. 89 Alternatively,
and more likely as a matter of history, commons problems were
resolved by either outsiders or big men within a society, who im-
posed and enforced an already established institutional structure. 9°
from defection are less than those from cooperation. M. DAVIS, supra note 81, at 133-35.
While the prisoners' dilemma is also a non-zero sum game, the extra social value created by
cooperation is not large enough to offset the individual gain from noncooperative exploitation
of the resource. For example, Umbeck reports that gold panners in the California gold rush
were able to establish a private property system without the force of the state ensuring
cooperation. Umbeck, supra note 83, at 54-56.
89 There is substantial evidence that the actual "commons," the communal fields outside
the villages in sixteenth century England, were actually highly regulated by social custom
and its enforcement mechanisms. Overexploitation, therefore, was never a problem. See Cox,
No Tragedy of the Commons, 7 ENV'T ETHICS 49,53-59 (1985).
99 The actual history of the distribution of "unowned" (e.g., Indian) property supports
this. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 503 (1823). The prevalence of the rule of capture as
a method to distribute previously unowned property is also consistent with my story. See
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (1805); Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV.
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In effect, this is a cross-subsidization argument that assumes that
such systems of control have substantial fixed costs that can be
shared across discrete problems. This is certainly the case with air
and water pollution, where existing mechanisms of government
monitoring and punishment have been applied to address a prob-
lem that individuals acting alone would have been unable to resolve.
In financial markets, most transferability costs pose cooperative
problems rather than commons problems. Thus, when the demand
for transactions is sufficient and the number of participants low,
everyone will find it in their interest to agree to a collective mech-
anism that both provides a cost reduction service and controls free
riding. For this reason, most markets for financial assets have
emerged spontaneously without government assistance with the in-
creasing demand for transactions, larger numbers of participants
and technology-induced reduction in costs. 91
The one type of cost that does present the commons problem
is that of price search. While a properly structured collective mech-
anism can eliminate some free riding on prices by limiting price
dissemination to those who pay for the service, price cost reduction
also depends on all parties submitting their trades to the collective
process. 92
 This poses a version of the efficient market paradox: if a
market is perfectly efficient, no participant has any incentive to
search for information.° In a price search collective mechanism,
the price produced would depart from the equilibrium price if
participants simply used the price to effect transactions on the side
at lower cost, and did not incur the expense of running their prices
through the mechanism. 94 When the number of participants trading
in a particular asset is small, this problem may not be substantial.
In such a situation, the mechanism may be tied to other cost re-
duction services that the trader needs for cost-effective trading, and
the trader has sufficient private incentive to contribute his prices to
1221, at 1241-43 (1979) (capture rule works satisfactorily and no point in changing rule in
mid-stream).
9, 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 35-39 (1973).
99 The New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges have zealously attempted to
protect their property interest in the price information created by their collective mechanisms.
J. Mulherin, J. Netter & J. Overdaht, The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a
Transaction Cost Perspective 20-54 (Apr. 26, 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). The commons problem I address here is caused by a failure to contribute to the
production of that information, not by free riding on the information.
95 Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN.
REV. 393, 404 (1980).
9, K. COHEN, S. MAIER, R. SCHWARTZ & D. WHITCOMB, supra note 51, at 160-61.
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the system. When the group of participants is large and diverse,
other techniques may be needed, such as government regulation. 95
3. Markets and Government Regulation
The problem of the commons is only quantitatively different
from the more widespread cooperative problem of creating and
maintaining collective mechanisms. Problems that appear to be com-
mons problems are simply situations in which the costs of enforce-
ment of the collective mechanism are extremely high. When the
social benefits, however, are high enough, a cost effective enforce-
ment technology will be found. Thus, a system of property rights
was created when the benefits of the system were perceived to
outweigh the costs of a governmental system of entitlement enforce-
ment. Likewise, the government enforces contracts with its coercive
powers because the collective mechanism of contract enforcement
is thought to be a more cost-effective way to resolve the security
cost problem of transfers than either the private individual practice
of hostage taking or private collective systems of agreement enforce-
ment. In this view, government enforcement or regulation is simply
one of many possible types of collective mechanisms for reducing
the costs of transfer.
Typical arguments about the justified role of government ac-
tion point to the existence of public goods, 96 or more generally,
externalities or market failures.'? What the variation in financial
market structures demonstrates, however, is that such problems can
be solved by private arrangements. 98 The commons and the public
goods problems are ripe candidates for government action, not
because they cannot be solved by private action, but because gov-
ernment action is the more efficient enforcement technology in such
circumstances. 99 Moreover, if the government already exists, the
Sugden, using an evolutionary approach to game theory, argues that evolutionary
stable collective mechanisms that are Pareto superior to individual provision need not be
Pareto optimal. Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. Econr. PERSPECTIVES 85, 87 (1989).
96 Steiner, supra note 31, at 15.
97 See Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market
Versus Nonniarket Allocation, in STAFF. OF SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT, JT. ECON.
COMM., 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 1 THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES:
'FHE PPB SYSTEM, 47 (it. Comm. Print 1969).
95 Cf. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L.	 EcoN. 557,372-74 (1974), reprinted
in R. COASE, THE FIRM, 'rHE MARKET, AND THE LAW 187, 208-11 (1988) (lighthouse services
historically provided privately to some extent).
99 Cf. Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 37, at 703 (government intervention
against externality is justified when "the costs of private internalization exceed the costs of
public intervention").
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considerable fixed costs incurred in setting up the police force and
court system are sunk costs, and the marginal costs of extending its
power to the new area may be small. Thus, there is a type of cross-
subsidization from crime prevention and national defense work to
other regulatory areas.
A simple, and I hope uncontroversial, example of this principle
is the prohibition of fraud in contracting.m As described above,
one of the costs of transacting is the danger that the quality of the
asset is not what you think it is. One source of this information is
the seller, but if the asset is of abnormally poor quality, the seller
has an incentive to deceive the buyer about its quality. Society could
simply rely on buyers to take whatever steps they think necessary
to assure themselves that the seller's representations are accurate.
It may be (and as a society, we have decided that) it is socially less
costly to prohibit such seller misrepresentations, and to enforce the
prohibition with the external coercive power of the state.
The scope of this prohibition, that is, the definition of what
constitutes "fraud," varies in financial markets.'°' There must exist,
however, some optimal regulatory point between overt misrepre-
sentations and the failure to disclose legitimately acquired infor-
mation. The test for external coercion (regulation) should not be
whether an action is "wrong" or "unfair," but whether public pro-
vision of protection is collectively cheaper than leaving individuals
to contract privately for such protection. Because secondary trading
of assets involves costs in addition to asset quality determination,
similar determinations must be made for all aspects of market struc-
ture. In fact, fraud is merely a subissue of the more general cost
reduction problem of markets. 1 °2 The institutional structures of
markets for financial assets reduce the costs of transacting, and the
question of government regulation of these structures turns on
whether public provision of this service is more "appropriately econ-
omiz[ing]" 1 " than private provision.
'')" The property system itself is nothing more than the governmental provision of a
collective mechanism that reduces the costs of transacting. We certainly could live in a society
in which private means could be used to acquire and protect an acquisition from poachers,
but we all believe we are better off with the governmental provision of that service.
1 °' The judicial elaborations of the scope of fraud under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5 (1989), suggest that the seller's failure to disclose relevant information can be
fraudulent as is an affirmative misrepresentation. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
102 Cf. Coffee, supra note 17, at 725-37 (public goods problem can justify mandatory
disclosure of securities laws).
10' Demsetz, supra note 35, at 33.
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One rough indicator of this in financial markets is the number
of participants in the market. A market provides a benefit to its
users that entails costs, and unless some institutional mechanism
exists to ensure that the beneficiaries bear those costs, the good
produced by the market will be underproduced. When, as is the
case in some markets, the number of participants is not great, the
collective mechanism can be enforced easily among the market
participants through private contracting. In other cases, however,
the costs of a private collective mechanism may exceed the private
expected gain from the use of the collective mechanism. This would
be true whenever the mechanism has trouble controlling free riders
because of the number of participants and their heterogeneity. In
such cases, external coercion may be the best method by which to
"economize."
III. MARKETS AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF MARKETS FOR
FINANCIAL ASSETS
The property theory of markets explains many of the structural
features observed in actual markets for trading financial assets. The
following subsections examine several of these markets to demon-
strate the power of this theory. For ease of exposition, I organize
the discussion along a rough continuum from decentralized to more
centralized market structures.'"
A. Counterparty Markets
In a counterparty market, buyers and sellers deal directly with
each other without the aid of any collective mechanisms. In one
sense, a counterparty market is not a market at all, but merely the
realm of bilateral contract. Buyers and sellers bear all the costs of
104 The issue of centralization is key to the fragmentation-consolidation debate over
market structure. The fragmentation-consolidation debate turns on whether the economies
of scale of centralization are bought at the cost of a loss of competitive pressures that might
otherwise drive down costs. See K. COHEN, S. MAIER, R. SCHWARTZ & D. WHITCOMB, supra
note 51, at 150-69; Cohen, Conroy & Maier, Order Flow and the Quality of the Market, in
MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 93 (1985);
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb, An Analysis of the Economic Justyication for Consolidation
in a Secondary Security Market, 6 J. BANK. & FIN. 1 17 (1982); Sametz, A Modest Proposal Toward
a National Market System—From CLUB to CLOB, in IMPENDING CHANGES FOR SECURITIES MAR-
KETS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EXCHANGES? 84 (1979); Silber, innovation, Competition, and New
Contract Design in Futures Markets, 1 J. FUT. MARKETS 123 (1981); Smidt, Which Road to an
Efficient Stock Market?, 27 FIN. ANAL. J., Sept.•Oct. 1971, at 20. Here, I attempt to break down
the discrete costs that markets may or may not handle through centralization.
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search, security and settlement directly, rather than relying on third
parties or some market structure.
The largest market of this type is the wholesale market for
foreign currency." While there is a separate retail decentralized
dealer market for foreign exchange," over seventy-seven percent
of all foreign exchange transactions occur in an interbank market.'° 7
In this market, a small number of individual international banks
and other entities maintain trading desks from which they contact
traders at other banks directly over telephone lines or computer
links." For most trades, other traders cannot observe an exchange,
its volume or price. Thus, simultaneous trades can occur at different
prices. Although Reuters provides a computer screen quotation
system," most trades are conducted by telephone, where one party
asks for the other party's prices for a particular currency."° In some
cases, money brokers put two traders together for a fee,"' but in
most trades no fees are charged and traders make their profits
through either astute trading or, more frequently, on general price
movements in the underlying currency. Finally, traders settle their
1" Interest rate swaps, currency swaps, loan participations, Eurodollar deposits and
various derivative products are also traded in counterparty markets. The organized futures
markets that trade standardized foreign exchange futures and options account for less than
5% of the daily foreign exchange turnover. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 7, at 5.
1°6
 In this retail market, customers purchase from banks both spot foreign exchange
and customized forward contracts to satisfy current and future needs for the currency or to
hedge open positions. Corporations and individuals with spot foreign exchange needs gen-
erally trade with banks on an ad hoc basis. In such consumer trades, banks provide a service
to their customers by either selling or purchasing foreign currency from the banks' inven-
tories. Banks charge a fee for such service, in addition to receiving a mark-up from the
interbank bids and offers. This approximates a decentralized dealer market of the type
discussed in the next subsection.
'" BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 7, at 4.
'" The actual number of banks and other entities is difficult to determine. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York conducted two market surveys that polled forty-four banks in
1977 and forty-one in 1980. R. KUBARYCH, FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS IN THE UNITED
STATES 12 Sc n.8 (rev. ed. 1983). A more recent survey by the Bank for International
Settlements suggests that the number of active participants has increased significantly and
now includes a number of nonfinancial companies. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
supra note 7, at 3-4.
1 " Reuter's Monitor Dealing Service, introduced in 1981, has 2,300 subscribers and
handles approximately 33% of the foreign exchange volume. The service does not require
its subscribers to report on the screen actual trades or prices at which actual trades occur.
Cookson, Dealing Room Systems: 24-hour traders, Fin. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, spec. § , at IV.
' 10 R. KUBARYCH, supra note 108, at 12-14.
" 1 R. KUBARYCH, supra note 108, at 13-15. The Bank for International Settlements
estimates that on average 40% of all transactions are brokered, but that the percentage is
declining. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Supra note 7, at 3.
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transactions through correspondent accounts, with each other or
with common intermediaries, that can be offset to reflect the trans-
actions.' 12
There is little government regulation of this trading activity.
The regulation that exists takes the form of prudential limits on
the foreign currency positions that banks can take, and is intended
to protect the financial stability of the trading institution as a reg-
ulated bank." 3 This regulation arises from the regulation of banks
as deposit-taking institutions. Institutions that do not fall under
banking regulation may trade free of such supervision.
Although some collective mechanisms may be emerging in this
market, the individual participants usually bear their own costs of
transacting because of the small number of participants and the
nature of the assets being traded. Because the few participants form
a close-knit group, over time a trader is likely to be either a buyer
or a seller on an equal number of occasions. Outsiders are unable
to effectively break into the trading. 114 In addition, the financial
assets regularly traded are few in number and highly standardized.
Only United States dollars, Deutsche marks, Japanese yen, and
British pounds are regularly traded." 5 Thus, it is possible for banks
to carry each of these assets in their portfolios. Moreover, infor-
mation about asset quality is publicly provided to anyone willing to
open a newspaper or follow a radio report. Unlike assets issued by
private firms, price search generates minimal additional quality in-
formation about foreign exchange. 16
" I The "Fxnet" foreign exchange settlement system, created in 1987 by 12 banks, settles
transactions among its members by netting trades between member counterparties through-
out the day, and making a computerized net payment at the end of the day. The board of
Fxnet has recently opened membership in the system to nonbanks and granted a contract to
Quotron International, a Citicorp subsidiary, to expand and develop the system to meet the
needs of the entire foreign exchange market. Cane, Quorron wins forex order, Fin. Times, Aug.
15, 1989, at 24.
115 Most international banks are subject to general capital requirements and regulatory
supervision of their asset positions. See, e.g., BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, COM-
MITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, PROPOSALS FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (Dec. 1987); 12
C.F.R. § 225 App. A—C (1990). Regulators fear that, given the volatility of the prices in this
market, open positions in foreign currencies are particularly risky. Through regulatory
supervision, banks are generally required to eliminate their open positions on a daily basis.
114 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
115 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 514pra note 7, at 6, 14-16 (tables GI to
C-3).	 •
116 The intervention of central banks in the foreign currency markets does move the
price, and is the one case in which the price may disclose information not generally available.
See supra note 61 (price could disclose activities of important market participants).
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Because of the small number of participants and currencies in
the foreign currency market and the nature of the assets being
traded, the costs of transfer are low and individual provision is cost
effective. Bank participants have no problem locating counterpar-
ties or quickly comparing the prices those counterparties offer.
Information about the quality of a United States dollar is easy to
obtain, and a collective mechanism for accumulating such infor-
mation would not be cost effective. Because of the low number of
participants and the extremely high number of transactions, timing
costs are low; within the interbank group, someone is always willing
to deal at a particular point in time. The repeated dealings between
the small number of well-known participants means that security
costs remain minimal."' Finally, the use of offsetting accounts re-
duces the costs of settlement.
B. Decentralized Dealer Markets
A wide range of financial assets is traded in decentralized dealer
markets. The main feature of a dealer market is the existence of
firms or individuals who are willing to hold a supply of assets in
inventory and who stand ready to trade those assets with other firms
and individuals. Such "dealers" provide a collective mechanism that
reduces both timing and counterparty search costs. Dealers make it
easier for market participants to find a counterparty and bridge the
supply and demand time gap. Dealers bear the cost of searching
for the assets and the cost of advertising to inform buyers that they
hold such assets. Instead of engaging in costly searches themselves,
buyers and sellers of the asset can contact the dealers directly. For
these services, dealers charge a mark-up over their cost on the assets
they sell out of their inventory. 1 E 8 While most of the mark-up rep-
resents storage charges and reimbursement for the expenses of
search and security costs, some part is attributable to the dealer's
informational advantage over the customer.
1. Government Securities Market
The secondary market for government securities, both Trea-
sury bills and Treasury notes and bonds, is a type of decentralized
1 " The regulation of many participants because of their banking activities affects security
costs. While such regulations do not directly ensure performance of a trade, they reduce the
chance of default due to insolvency.
118
 See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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dealer market." 9 The market is bifurcated between a wholesale
market and a retail market. In the wholesale market, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) authorizes a small group of
banks and securities houses, called "primary dealers," to trade with
the FRBNY in its open market operations. 12° These primary dealers
trade among themselves by means of direct telephone contacts and
seven inter-dealer brokers,'" who provide real-time secondary trad-
ing prices on computer screens to the primary dealers. 122
In the retail market, one inter-dealer broker facilitates trans-
actions between the primary dealers, other dealers and brokers,"
and a group of largely institutional participants.'" Only one broker
transmits a limited set of current prices in the wholesale inter-dealer
market to nonprimary dealers and other participants.' 25 Retail mar-
ket participants, therefore, must search for the best price (which
includes a dealer mark-up) by canvassing many dealers.'" In the
retail markets, retail brokers insist on credit reviews of potential
customers to reduce default risk.
Treasury securities are issued in "book-entry" form. Instead of
transferring physical certificates of ownership, a transfer is simply
recorded on the books of a Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury
and the purchaser receives a receipt noting the transfer. Settlement,
therefore, involves only the transfer of cash' and receipts, and is
conducted by use of clearing bank debits and credits on behalf of
112 K. GARBAGE, SECURITIES MARKETS 430-35 (1982).
190
	
all, there are 42 primary dealers. They also bid directly at the regular auctions
held by the Department of the Treasury for Treasury bonds and Treasury bills. Most of the
bids submitted are made to fill orders by clients of the primary dealers who are end investors
seeking to add such assets to their portfolio. Such bidding is also open to the public. U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 12, 17-18.
121 Garbade, Pomrenze & Silber, supra note 58, at 55.
122 Approximately 58% of all trades in this wholesale market are conducted through
inter-dealer brokers. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 66-67.
125 Dealers and brokers totaled 1,841 as of July 1989, as reflected on the list of registered
broker-dealers. Id. at 26.
124 See Request for Comments on the Oversight of the U.S. Government and Agency
Securities Markets, Securities Act Release No. 34-21959, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,904 (Apr. 23, 1985).
155 That broker, Cantor Fitzgerald Securities Corporation, sells its prices to Telerate,
part of the Dow Jones information services group, which then distributes them. These prices
are not firm quotes, and no information is provided on completed transactions. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 77. There is some evidence of concerted primary dealer
opposition to attempts by inter-dealer brokers to publish widely inter-dealer price informa-
tion. Id. at 82; cf. J. Mulherin, J. Netter & J. Overdahl, supra note 92, at 20-54 (New York
Stock Exchange's and other exchanges' attempts to control dissemination of price informa-
tion).
126
 Typically, the mark-up is 1/32% to 2/42% (3 to 13 basis points) for Treasury notes
and bonds. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 54.
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customers. The Government Securities Clearing Corporation,' 27 a
private venture, is attempting to centralize settlement in the mar-
ket. 128
Regulation of the market is limited for the most part to ensur-
ing the financial credit-worthiness of dealers and brokers.' 29 Before
authorizing dealers to become primary dealers, the FRBNY requires
that those dealers demonstrate their financial ability to bear the risk
of the market. This includes meeting specified capital adequacy
requirements and submitting daily position and risk information to
the FRBNY.'" The primary dealers, all other dealers, and brokers
are required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) or, if they are a bank, with the appropriate banking
authority."' Registration entails meeting capital adequacy standards
modeled on the FRBNY's requirements. In addition to specifying
the applicability of the general anti-fraud provisions of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act,I 32
 the regulations affect advertising' 33 and the
127
 The dealers, brokers and clearing banks in the market own the majority interest in
the GSCC, which acts to spread the risk of unsettled trades among all participants. Partici-
pating dealers must have a net worth of $10 million and excess net capital of $10 million;
participating brokers must have liquid capital of $4.2 million. Id. at 7L
128
 Id. at 34 & n.16.
129
 The Government Securities Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1988), was largely
prompted by the well-publicized failures of several unregulated government securities dealers
who dealt exclusively in government securities. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET 9-14 ( June '20, 1985), reprinted in
Regulation and Supervision of the Government Securities Market: Hearing before Subcomm. on Domestic
Monetary Policy, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 347-
52 (Comm. Print 1985) (Drysdale Government Securities, Inc. (1982), Lion Capital Group,
Inc. (1984), E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc. (1985) and Bevill Bresler and Schulman
Asset Management Corp. (1985)). Prior to the Act, only primary dealers were subject to
direct government regulation of their government securities trading through their contrac-
tual relationship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Many other market partici-
pants, however, were subject to general capital adequacy requirements and other regulations
by virtue of their status as securities broker-dealers or banks.
130 See Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Government Security Dealers Proposed by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York: Hearing before Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy, House Comm. un
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 290-344 (Comm. Print 1985) (capital
requirements); U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES: AN EXAMI-
NATION OF VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOUT ACCESS TO BROKERS' SERVICES 14 (Dec. 1977) (position
and risk reporting requirements).
"" Government Securities Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988); see 17 C.F.R. 240.15Ca1-
1 (1989). The cash and securities accounts of customers of most dealers are protected under
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation insurance fund against failure of the covered
firm. This coverage is required of most dealers who are registered with the SEC. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 60.
182 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1990).
55 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 32-33. Regulation of advertising
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operation of clearing agencies.' 34 There are no limits on the number
of primary dealers or government securities broker-dealers that can
be recognized or registered, and no attempt is made to regulate
actual trading practices in the market.' 35
The number of participants and the demand for transactions
in the retail government securities market explains the development
of the collective mechanism of the dealer. The number of retail
market participants has remained relatively small and, outside the
wholesale market, the demand for transactions is low. While the
overall number of transactions is tremendous, most transactions
occur on the wholesale market, in which the primary dealers trade
with other dealers and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The
dealers carry sufficient inventories to perform the timing and coun-
terparty search functions for other less active participants.
The small number of active participants, however, reduces the
need for a collective settlement mechanism.' 36 In the inter-dealer
market, participants trade frequently with each other and can net
out their bilateral transactions at the end of the day. In the retail
markets, the low number of transactions does not justify such a
mechanism. Security with respect to the inter-dealer market is pro-
vided collectively by the regulatory registration requirements, and
privately in the retail market by customer credit checks. Finally, as
with the foreign exchange market, information on asset quality is
available to everyone at little cost. The quality of a Treasury security
depends on public information about government policy and the
was delegated to the National Association of Securities Dealers (the "NASD"), the self-
regulatory organization of the securities industry, which promulgated advertising require-
ments for government securities that established a pre-publication review of material. NASD
Government Securities Rules § 8(b) NASD Manual (CCH) 9 2428 (1991).
154 The SEC has the authority to register and regulate clearing agencies. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78q-1 (1988); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ab2-1 to 240.17Ac1-14 (1990).
135 The Government Securities Act of 1986 authorizes regulations only with respect to
registration, discipline, inspection and fraud. 15 U.S.C. 78oA(1)(2) (1988). Although there
is some regulation of dealers' sales practices when the dealers arc banks or members of the
New York Stock Exchange, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra 7, at 47, the vast
majority (over 1370 dealers) are not so regulated. Id. at 49. Sales practice rules cover both
the suitability of purchasers for the security being sold and the mark-up charged by the
dealer. The SEC has taken the position that mark-ups in the government securities business
are typically 1/32% to 3-1/2%, lower than those in the equity market. Zero Coupon Securities,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-24368, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,575 (Apr. 29, 1987). More
importantly, there is no regulation of the actual structure of trading.
190 While the retail market is home to over 1,000 dealers, see supra note 135, the small
number of active primary dealers are the center of the market, see K. GARRADE, Pra note
119, at 430. Nonprimary dealers must deal frequently with a small group of primary dealers,
and reputational information can travel quickly.
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basic performance of the economy. Although the use of inter-dealer
brokers and their screens provides some collectivization of price
search costs for the inter-dealer market, there is little need for a
fully collective mechanism for all participants in the broader retail
market. In a small market with few participants, reputation plays a
crucial role; a party who consistently quotes noncompetitive prices
to less informed customers will quickly be viewed as a "sharp" trader
who provides questionable price information.
2. NASD Over-the-Counter Market
Although it differs from the Treasury market, the over-the-
counter market for small stocks and for off-exchange transactions
in exchange stocks (the "third market") run by the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers' 37 (the "NASD") is also a decentralized
dealer market. In this market, equity securities that do not meet
listing requirements' 38 are inventoried by one or more securities
firms, all of whom are members of the NASD.'39 Frequently, the
firm that underwrote the initial public offering of the stock acts as
the dealer or market maker. A broker or investor will call the dealer
and receive a quotation that includes both the bid and offered price.
As in the Treasury bond market, price information for these small
stocks is difficult to obtain directly. The NASD requires its members
to make the prices of their transactions available to the NASD,'"
but this information is not disseminated immediately to the market.
During the course of the trading day, only the dealer firms have
much information on the price of the assets. In contrast with the
Treasury market, settlement is collectively provided by the National
Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC"). 141
I" The NASD is the registered self-regulatory national securities association of securities
dealers and brokers that sets rules for participation by its members in the securities markets.
Although in passing the Maloney Act in 1938, 15 U.S.C. 9 78o (1988), Congress contemplated
that there would be several registered national securities associations, the NASD has been
the only one organized.
15 This refers to securities that do not meet the requirements for listing on the NASD's
National Market System ("NMS"), Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, pt. III, § 2, NASD Manual
(CCH) 9 1809 (1991), or the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
system ("NASDAQ"), id. pt. 11, I, NASD Manual (CCH) 9 1803 (1991).
I$9 The number of active participants in the market is much greater: as of October 25,
1990, the NASD had approximately 6,000 member firms with 425,000 registered represen-
tatives. Telephone interview with NASD Information Service (Nov. 20, 1990).
' 40 Schedule H to NASD By-Laws 2, NASD Manual (CCH) 9 1933 (1991).
The NSCC clears and settles trades centrally for all transactions in the over-the-
counter market as well as on the organized exchanges. See Performance of the Equity Market
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Regulation is also more extensive in this market than in the
Treasury securities market. As in all United States private equity
and debt securities markets, market participants must register with
the SEC,i 42 be a member of the NASD,' 43 and meet financial health
requirements,'" including membership in the customer insurance
scheme of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). 14 '
Unlike the government securities market, in the over-the-counter
market regulation affects the actual structure of trading itself. The
NASD's Rules of Fair Practice require dealers to quote Firm prices,
not mere indications. Dealers may not grant price concessions or
discounts to non-NASD members, and charges for services must be
reasonable and must not unfairly discriminate between customers.
Inventory or dealer transactions must occur at "fair prices," consid-
ering such factors as expenses, market conditions and reasonable
dealer profits.' 46 Generally, this rule places a five percent upper
limit on dealer mark-ups. 147
The last rule, the "fair mark-up rule," reflects both the differ-
ence in the nature of the assets traded in this market from those in
the government securities market and the larger number of partic-
During the October Market Break and Regulatory Overview, in REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS VI-15 to VI-16 (1988) [hereinafter BRADY REPORT]; COM-
ment, International Securities Trading: The United States and Great Britain Develop Clearing and
Settlement Procedures for a New Age, 19 CAL. W. 'yet, L.J. 129, 132-33 (1988). The NSCC
ensures members' performance of their obligations to settle transactions. Individual members
deposit an amount that is determined by their individual historical settlement activity. See
BRADY REPORT, supra, at VI-16 to V1-17.
es Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, 15 U.S.C. 78o (1988).
1 " See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, fi 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(13)(8) (1988).
'" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1988); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 (1990) (net capital requirements based on customer accounts); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-3 (1990) (reserve requirements for protection of customer accounts).
'' The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78ccc (1988),
established the quasi-governmental Securities Investor Protection Corporation to insure cus-
tomer accounts with broker-dealers up to $500,000 per customer. See BRADY REPORT, supra
note 141, at VI-17; R. TEWELES & E. BRADLEY, THE STOCK MARKET 317-20 (5th ed. 1987).
16 NASD Rule of Fair Practice 4, NASD Manual (CCH) 11 2154 (1991).
"47 In the 1940s, the NASD conducted a survey of the mark-up practices of its members.
As a result of the survey, the Board of Governors of the NASD announced that a 5% mark-
up was adequate to ensure a healthy and viable over-the-counter business. Pursuant to NASD
Rules of Fair Practice § 4, the NASD Board of Governors adopted the "NASD Mark-Up
Policy," which indicated to members that the NASD believed that a flexible "5% Policy" was
a reasonable interpretation of section 4. NASD Mark-Up Policy, NASD Manual (CCH) 112154
(1991) (adopted Oct. 25, 1943). Although rigid application of the 5% rule against individual
dealers is flatly prohibited by the Maloney Act, § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. 78oA(b)(6) (1988), it
has become the standard in the business. Recent investigations into "penny stock fraud"
revolve around the mark-up problem. See supra note 15.
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ipants. Information about the quality of financial assets issued by
private companies is more costly to obtain than similar information
about government securities. Thus, buyers and sellers rely more on
the asset quality information contained in the price. Nevertheless,
when parties do not have access to up-to-date information about
prices and transactions, some other search method must be used to
assure traders that they are getting the "best available" price. The
larger number of dealers, however, makes individual search costs
prohibitive, and participants have more difficulty in relying on
mechanisms such as reputation. In this market, the fair mark-up
rule is a type of collective mechanism, provided by regulation, to
reduce the costs of price search that market participants would
otherwise bear. The large number of participants in this market
also supports collective mechanisms that reduce other transaction
costs. Private dealers reduce timing and counterparty search costs,
while government regulation of the broker-dealers' financial con-
dition and of central settlement mechanisms reduces both settle-
ment and security costs.
C. Bulletin Board Markets
Other types of markets directly address the information or
search problems of transacting. Providing all market participants
with the prices at which all traders in the market are willing to
transact reduces these problems. The bulletin board market is the
simplest of these structures. An example is the posting of "for sale"
notices on a student center bulletin board, •discussed above.'" In
one variation, the "call market," or "batch trading," orders for a
particular asset are allowed to accumulate and then the asset is put
up for sale at a single time, setting one price.'" In this market
structure, buyers and sellers come to a central location or join a
single computer link. The bulletin board contains a single "book"
of offered prices, that is, the extant offers and bids for the asset.'"
This market structure also reduces counterparty search costs, albeit
in a different way than the dealer market structure. Instead of
compensating a dealer for providing this service, bulletin board
market participants come, either physically or electronically, to one
place to locate counterparties. This generates substantial savings,
148 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
149 See Whitcomb, supra note 46, at 241.
''° See Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb, supra note 104, at 117, 118 n.l.
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even if individuals bear their allocable share of maintaining the
bulletin board structure. Moreover, this market eliminates non-
productive counterparty searches; each trader knows for certain
where to go to locate counterparties.
I. Screen Quotation Systems
The simplest forms of bulletin board markets are the infor-
mation systems provided by Reuters ' 51 and Telerate'" in the foreign
exchange and Treasury bond markets.'" In these, all participants
agree to provide to the operator of the information system the
participants' quotations for assets. The operator then repackages
the information and transmits it electronically to all purchasers of
the system. Subscribers to the service can observe all the extant
quotations and track the sources of such quotations. Access is re-
stricted to those willing to pay for the system, which defrays its cost
and provides a profit to the operator, The operator has an incentive
to ensure that subscribers not only take price information, but also
contribute information of their own. If an operator fails to compel
participants to provide their own price information, the value of
the product quickly deteriorates. The system would not reflect the
entire market, and those who did provide information would have
little incentive to continue to do so.
Such a mechanism requires a substantial number of participants
who have a significant level of demand for transactions in the asset.
First, the fixed costs of such a system are high and a private provider
must be assured of sufficient revenues to make the system viable. 154
Second, users of the system must expect to engage in a sufficient
number of transactions to justify the subscription fee. The markets
that have fostered the development of such computer screen bul-
letin board systems exhibit these traits. In the mid-1980s, the num-
ber of banks and other institutions interested in trading in foreign
currencies began to rise, giving Reuters an opportunity to develop
its system. Likewise, Cantor Fitzgerald Securities Corporation, the
1 " See supra note 109.
02 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
153 Reuters used to provide a bulletin board system to the members of the Association
of International Bonds Dealers for the trading of Eurobonds. On that system, dealers would
quote nonfirm prices. Users would then telephone or telex the dealers to get firm quotations
and to execute trades. Tying down the Euromarkets, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1987, at 73.
I" On occasion, providers of this information have attempted to subsidize the service
by requiring subscribers to use the provider as a broker to execute trades. My unsystematic
observations indicate that such a strategy has not generally succeeded.
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only broker serving both retail and inter-dealer markets in govern-
ment securities, was able to draw on its wider customer base to
support the Telerate system. In both cases, users are left to their
own devices to reduce the, timing, security and settlement costs of
trading.
2. Hong Kong, Tokyo and Other Stock Exchanges' 55
Several stock exchanges also operate on the bulletin board
principle. For example, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is a trading
hall in which rows of seats for members are arranged in front of a
long curved chalkboard.'" Members who want to post an order
price for a customer approach the board and enter the order price
along with the member's initials.' 57 If there are many bids and
offers, a queue is developed in which only the two best bids and
offers are recorded on the board.''s The exchange provides only
the room, equipment (including, presumably, the chalk) and some
surveillance. Members, by exchange rule, must bring all trades to
the board; 59 unless the amount of the trade exceeds
HK$ 1,000,000.' 6° The number of memberships on the exchange is
fixed, and members of the exchange pay for the costs of the bulletin
board through transaction fees. In addition, the exchange provides
centralized security and settlement services, but these services are
independent of the bulletin board structure itself.
The Tokyo Stock Exchange provides for each stock an order-
book clerk, or saitori, who matches buy and sell orders. Instead of
viewing a range of prices, traders see the single price produced by
the clerk. 16 ' For the most actively traded stocks, all floor brokers
and traders on the Tokyo Stock Exchange give their orders verbally
to these exchange functionaries, who are prohibited from trading
'" The Sydney, Singapore and Brussels stock exchanges all operate some type of bulletin
board system.
156 K. COHEN, S. MAIER, R. SCHWARTZ & D. WHITCOMB, supra note 51, at 21.
'" In some bulletin board markets, such as the Montreal Stock Exchange and the
Toronto Stock Exchange, the exchange provides officials who run the board.
"6 All prices are firm for at least one lot, generally 1,000 shares, and can be good for
up to twelve lots.
159 Cf. NYSE Rule 390, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2390 (1989) (similar rule requiring all
members to execute principal trades on exchange); AMSE Rule 5, Am. Stock Ex. Guide
(CCH) ¶ 9225 (1989) (same);
' 6° K. COHEN, S. MAIER, R. SCHWARTZ & D. WHITCOMB, supra note 51, at 21, 28.
16 ' See R. TEWELES & E. BRADLEY, supra note 145, at 214; Macey & Kanda, supra note
18, at 1042-46.
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for their own account.' 62 When there is a match, or when a broker
brings a market order, the clerk executes the orders and reports
the transaction to another exchange employee. This employee en-
ters the transaction in the Tokyo Stock Exchange's computer.' 63
One floor broker cannot trade directly with another unless the trade
occurs within the bid and offer prices being quoted at the time by
the order clerk.'"
While the number of private equity and debt securities traded
on such markets and the number of participants are large, the
average number of transactions in each security is relatively small.
The bulletin board is a collective mechanism that allows members
to pool the costs of trading across assets to reduce both counterparty
search and price discovery costs. As a large department store brings
a wide variety of products under one roof, the bulletin board brings
together a large number of private equity and debt assets. Unlike
the decentralized dealer structure of the department store, and like
sales of furniture through the college bulletin board, the market
works best if all assets for sale are brought to the board.' 63 Partici-
pants, therefore, may find it worthwhile to agree ex ante to run all
their trades through the bulletin board and forego off-market trad-
ing. 166 This funnels investor demand for trades into the central
market, thus supporting that market by generating transaction fees
for the exchange.' 67
162 K. COHEN, S. MAIER, K. ScitwAirrz & D. WHITCOMB, Supra note 51, at 20.
1" Both the Vienna Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange operated similar
systems. Id. In Frankfurt, only West German banks are permitted to trade securities for
customers. For the most active issues, orders are transmitted to kursmaklers (official brokers)
who execute trades.
164 Id.
1" The bulletin board may have aspects of a localized natural monopoly. To the extent
that the fixed costs of setting up the board are high and the average costs decline steadily
with the demanded number of transactions, a natural monopoly exists. K. CASE & K. FAIR,
supra note 5, at 323-24. If technology reduced the fixed costs of the system, however, there
could be competing bulletin boards serving the same customer base. Alternatively, if the
demand for trading increases, then the conditions for a natural monopoly may disappear.
In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has faced several new competitors in the
1970s, and all seem to coexist. See Cunningham, Moiling the Goalposts: Financial Market Reg-
ulation in Hong Kong and the Crash of October 1987, 15 L. Sc Soc. livq. 1,20 (1990).
166 A similar rationale could be applied to the 1792 Buttonwood Tree Agreement which
established the New York Stock Exchange. Not only did the Agreement fix prices, but more
importantly it required members to deal first with each other. F. EAMES, THE NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE 14 (1968). This tended to ensure a sufficient concentration of price quo-
tations on the bulletin board to induce traders to come to that market. In addition, it
prevented free riding brokers. Haddock & Macey, supra note 27, at 517.
167 Some of the fees on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange contribute to the provision of
the collective settlement and security system.
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The number of participants, however, also poses collective en-
forcement problems. Because of the nature of the assets traded,
asset quality determination costs are high and can be reduced by
reliance on the collective price search mechanism. If, however,
members with access to the exchange conducted trades off the
exchange, the value of the price search and counterparty search
services provided to members would be reduced. Moreover, such
off-market trading would increase the average cost per transaction
of providing the collective mechanism. The Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change rule requiring members to present and execute trades on
the exchange both maintains the total level of transaction fees col-
lected by the exchange and supports the integrity of the collective
price search mechanism. In effect, the rule increases the number
of transactions and participants at the central market that support
the collective mechanism. In a market with a small number of
participants, effective methods of retaliation can be used against
those who attempt to free ride. In markets with more numerous
participants, more formal methods of enforcement might be re-
quired.
D. Competitive Market Maker Markets
Because of the relatively low demand for transactions on bul-
letin board markets, individual traders must bear their own timing
costs. When the demand for transactions is greater, timing is less of
a problem; traders will have to wait shorter periods for appropriate
counterparties to appear. There will still be periods, however, when
a willing buyer cannot find a willing seller, or vice versa. If there is
sufficient demand for transactions, some individuals may find it
profitable to act as dealers at the central market. "Market makers"
are dealers on a centralized market who bridge the time gap be-
tween the appearance of buyers and sellers by carrying assets in
their portfolios for sale, or by being short (that is, willing to buy)
an asset.' 68
 In exchange for altering their investment portfolios to
less desirable makeups, less active market participants compensate
the market makers who trade at less favorable prices. The source
168 Models of the function of market makers have proliferated. See Hakansson, Beja &
Kale, On the Feasibility of Automated Market Making by a Programmed Specialist, 40 J. FIN. 1, 8-
11 (1985) (demand-smoothing service); Garman, Market Microstructures, 31 FIN. EcoN. 257,
265 (1976) (best estimator of true order generation); Grossman & Miller, supra note 64, at
622-26 (provider of immediacy); K. COHEN, S. MA/ER, R. SCHWARTZ & D. WHITCOMB, supra
note 51, at 4 (competitor with market spread set by limit orders).
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of this compensation is the informational advantage that the market
maker acquires in its position at the center of trading.
1. Open Outcry and Other Physical Pit Systems
Many options markets and almost all futures markets, financial
as well as commodity, employ the open outcry structure. In these
markets, trades are executed in some type of physical pit in which
all traders are in visual and auditory contact with each other. Orders
from customers are signaled, physically or electronically, to an in-
dividual trader in the pit who then searches for the counterparty
willing to offer the best price for the order. Within the pit, certain
traders choose to act as market makers; a particular pit will have as
many market makers as the demand for timing services permits.
The open outcry system, with its competitive market makers,
is the structure of trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME), the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), 169 the London Inter-
national Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE),'" the Marche a
Terme International de France, the London Traded Options Ex-
change, the New York Futures Exchange and the Swiss Options
and Futures Exchange. Each of these markets limits membership,
or the right to trade on the exchange, and memberships are traded
in a separate secondary market. In the CME and the CBOT pits,
traders shout out bids and offers for an asset and accompany the
shout with hand signals.'n A bid or offer is good only at the time
of the shout. Another trader desiring to "hit" or accept such a bid
or offer establishes eye contact and shouts and signals his accep-
tance. The accepting trader might be standing all the way across
the pit. Each party to a completed trade records the specifics of the
trade on a card and forwards it to the party's clearing firm for
clearance and settlement.
While all traders in the pit should be able to observe any trade
taking place, the exchanges facilitate price search by posting some
of the trade sizes and prices. Exchange employees in the pit observe
as many trades as possible and radio size and price figures to other
to The Aurora computerized pit trading system, under development at one time by the
CBOT, attempted to replicate on a computer screen the information available in the physical
pit. Richardson, The Twilight of the Gods, INTERMARKET, Apr. 1989, at 22. The CBOT has
since abandoned this effort and agreed to join forces with the CME on its Globex system.
1" LIFFE operates a screen-based system, the Automated Pit Trading system (the
"APT"), that replicates the physical pit. Hargreaves, Traders Hail Liffe Computer System After
Modest Start, Fin. Times, Dec. 1, 1989, at 31.
11 CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 34 (1985).
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employees on catwalks above the pit, who in turn enter them into
the exchange's computer system. The system then transmits the
information to a series of monitors on the trading floor and the
large electronic displays on the walls of the trading floor. The
primary responsibility for reporting each trade, however, falls on
the traders themselves. The traders must report trades to the pit
reporter and submit their order or trading cards to exchange offi-
cials at the close of each day.
Traders act as either "brokers," employed by firms to fill cus-
tomer orders, or "locals" trading for their own account. Local trad-
ers compete with one another as market makers in each pit. They
invest their own capital to take positions in the asset being traded.
The exchanges do not officially designate or register specific traders
as market makers. Rather, any member can begin to act as such, if
it is cost justified for the member to do so, and provide timing
services to other traders. Very often, local traders also act as brokers
for orders coming from off the exchange, the so-called "dual ca-
pacity." 172 As with any dealer, market making traders earn their
profits from their inventory transactions. To do this, they must gain
and exploit an informational advantage.' 73 By maintaining a con-
stant presence in the pit, and by constantly observing actual price
movements, market making traders can read market information
from the prices. This enables them to stay a step ahead of other
traders engaged in derivatively informed trading.' 74 That is, as
prices adjust to new information coming into the market, market
PS That traders can act both for their own account and as brokers for customers raises
possible conflicts of interest. The most serious practice that raises the conflict is "front-
running": traders who have large sell orders from customers would want to first sell any of
their assets held for their own account before introducing the large order to the market. In
that way, traders sell out before the price is depressed by the large sell order. The same
result can be accomplished by two or more traders sharing order information. Front-running
is expressly prohibited by regulation. Rule 155.2(a)—(b), 17 C.F.R. 155.2(a)—(b) (1990). The
sharing of order information is also prohibited. Rule 155.2(d), 17 C.F.R. 155.2(d) (1990);
Rule 155.3(b), 17 C.F.R. 155.3(b) (1990). Traders are also banned from engaging in
accommodation trades, that is, trades by one trader intended to assist another trader accom-
plish an illegal objective. See Markham, supra note 13, at 17-22. Efforts are being made to
eliminate the potential conflicts of interest facilitated by dual capacity. Recently, the CME, in
response to public and customer concerns, has approved a ban on dual trading in all contracts
that have traded at least 10,000 contracts per day for six months. See Durr, CME Plans Dual
Trading Curbs, Fin. Times, Mar. 19, 1990, at 25. Since 1987, the CME has had in place a dual
trading ban for its Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index contract. Id.
145 This is analogous to Manne's suggestion that inside traders production of informa-
tion should be rewarded by permitting them to exploit the information. H. MANNE, supra
note 12, at 138-41.
14 Gilson Kraakman, supra note 17, at 572.
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making traders are able to get into or out of an asset before it
reaches its new equilibrium price.'"
Market makers also pick up other information in the pit, such
as which other traders and customers are actively buying or selling
the asset.'" Such information might suggest that large quantities of
an asset are about to come onto the market. Again, such non-price
information gives the constant trader an advantage.'" Obviously,
the availability of such an advantage attracts new entrants to the
market. The number of market makers that a centralized compet-
itive market maker system, such as the futures pits, can support
depends on the variability of the timing demand for the use of the
market, and the predictability of price changes in the market.'"
On the commodity exchanges, the standard institutional struc-
ture is one that employs collective mechanisms to reduce both se-
curity costs and settlement costs. Unlike most other markets, traders
trade with the exchange, or its member clearing houses, as their
counterparty for settlement and security purposes. All trades on
the CME and the CBOT are viewed legally as trades between clear-
ing firms registered with the exchanges. The exchanges set margin
requirements that require traders to post collateral with the clearing
houses. This ensures that both the buyer and the seller of an asset
will meet their future obligations with respect to that asset.'" The
exchanges also require that all positions be marked to market (that
is, valued in the traders' account at fair market value) every day,
and that payments be transferred to meet margin requirements. In
175 It has been demonstrated that even in a semi-strong efficient market, synthesizing
news takes some time and the price moves to the new equilibrium price incrementally, rather
than by jumping. See Jennings & Barry, On Information Dissemination and Equilibrium Asset
Prices: A Note, 19 .1. FIN. & QUAN. ANAL. 395,395 (1984). See generally Macey & Miller, supra
note 78, at 1083 (citing studies). Market makers are an important factor in the equilibrium
process. See R. ScilwAtm & D. WHITCOMB, supra note 62, at 43. Gilson & Kraakman suggest
that traders in general can benefit from derivatively informed trading. Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 17, at 572-79. While this may or may not be true for most traders, market makers
are in the best position to exploit such information.
170 A trader will know that particular traders routinely act as brokers for large customers.
' 77 As the recent indictments of participants in the Swiss franc and Japanese yen pits at
the CME suggest, this access to non-price information also facilitates fraudulent trading by
making derivative front-running and forms of curb trading easier. United States tr. Bailin, 731
F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHICAGO FUTURES
MARKET: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS ON TRADE PRACTICE ABUSES 10 (Mar. 1989) ("characteristics
of open outcry trading may allow floor participants to take advantage of customers").
17B See Grossman & Miller, supra note 64, at 627; Stoll, supra note 64, at 86.
175 See M. MILLER, J. HAWKE, B. MAKIEL. Se M. SCIIOLES, FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INQUIRY EXAMINING THE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987 17 (Spring 1988) (com-
mittee appointed by the CME).
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operating this system, the exchanges further require traders and
clearing firms to meet minimum net capital requirements and ex-
posure limits. In addition, the exchanges maintain a pool to cover
any clearing firm defaults, of which there have been none to date,
and can assess other clearing members to make up any shortfall.
These assessments are backed up by the informal commitments of
the exchanges' settlement banks to provide liquidity to the ex-
changes. 18°
Regulation of these markets is twofold. First, regulation bolsters
the market's security cost reduction aspects by mandating that ex-
changes adopt minimum capital and position rules. 18 ' While the
United States exchanges do not regulate the market makers sepa-
rately, any person engaging in the futures business must be regis-
tered with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (the
"CFTC").' 82 Although such rules have some impact in limiting entry,
the exchanges' limits on the number of memberships are more
important. Second, the Commodities Exchange Act and the CFTC
impose rules that mandate the structure of trading itself. All trading
in the specified assets must be conducted in the pits of a registered
exchange during designated hours.'" Government rules and reg-
ulations prohibit "prearranged trading," (trading in which the par-
ties agree to some aspect of a transaction before it is executed in
the pit) 184 "curb trading," (trading that occurs after the official close
of'pit trading), and "cross trading," (trading in which traders match
customer orders without offering them to the pit).'" A similar rule
prohibits "wash trades," (two trades, usually prearranged, that have
"5
 BRADY REPORT, supra note 141, at VI-28 to VI-29.
I , ' See, e.g., Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, § 4f, 7 U.S.C. § 61 (1988) (minimum
financial requirements); Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, § 8a(7)(D), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7)(D)
(1988) {power of Commission to alter exchange rules on "safeguards with respect to financial
responsibility of members"); Financial Reports of Futures Commission Merchants and Intro-
ducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.10 to 1.18 (1990) (minimum financial and reporting require-
ments); Speculative Position Limits, 17 C.F.R. § 1.61 (1990) (exchange must adopt rules that
limit "speculative" positions). American rules also require the absolute segregation of custom-
ers' funds from firms' own accounts. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, § 4d(2), 7 U.S.C.
§ 6d(2) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 1.20 (1990). Such rules have the same purpose as the SIPC
insurance scheme in the American securities markets.
INS Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, § 4d, 7 U.S.C. 6d (1988). The regulations
delegate much of the registration work to the National Futures Association, a recognized
private traders' association. 17 C.F.R. §§ 3.1 to 3.4, 3.10 to 3.18 {1990).
"5 Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, 4(a), 7 U.S.C. 6(a) (1988).
154 Trading Standards for Floor Brokers, Rule 155.2(f), 17 C.F.R. 155.2(f) (1989).
'" CFTC Regulation 1.38, 17 C.F.R. 1.38 (1989); see Markham, supra note 13, at 36;
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHICAGO FUTURES MARKET: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS ON
TRADE PRACTICE ABUSES 11 (Mar. 1989).
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no substance because they are entirely offsetting). ' 86 In a market in
which traders are extremely sensitive to indications of volume and
its source, wash trades transmit false information and might be used
to move prices. Regulations also require traders to record and re-
port all trades to the exchange.'"
The assets traded on these markets are limited in number,
though the number of transactions is extremely high. The assets,
particularly financial and commodities futures and options on in-
dexes, are more similar to government securities and foreign ex-
change than private equity or debt securities. As is the case with
those former assets, the information affecting their quality and price
is readily available.'" Moreover, the number of participants has
grown enormously over time. These features make the collective
reduction of transfer costs feasible. While the creation and main-
tenance of a small number of physical pits involves enormous fixed
costs, the demand for transactions and the number of participants
easily covers those costs. The system reduces counterparty and price
search costs by providing a central marketplace. The collective de-
vices for the reduction of security and settlement costs employed in
less active markets continue to make sense in this market. Finally,
the tremendous demand for transactions makes profitable the ex-
istence of a set of competitive market makers for each asset, which
in turn ensures to other participants the provision of timing services
at optimal prices.
2. Screen Trading Systems
Another version of the centralized competitive market maker
system is the screen-trading system. While many small scale screen-
trading systems simply put buyers and sellers together directly,' 89
la5 Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, § 4c, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (1988).
181 Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, § 4(a)(ii), 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)(3) (1988).
188 Most relevant information is market information that affects systematic risk of the
asset. The only type of "inside" information that a market participant can obtain is advance
knowledge of trading by a large participant. "Front-running" is the inside trading on the
futures markets. See supra note 172.
188 These include the Small Order Execution System of the NASD, the Computer
Assisted Trading systems of the Toronto and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, the National Securities
Trading System of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange (located in Jersey City, New Jersey), the
Midwest Automated Execution System of the Midwest Stock Exchange and the SEAQ Au-
tomated Execution Facility of the International Stock Exchange (formerly, the London Stock
Exchange). In each of these systems, orders are matched and executed automatically accord-
ing to a set of priority rules. See, e.g., COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, CHICAGO
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE'S PROPOSED GLOBE% TRADING SYSTEM 34-37 (Feb. 2, 1989); M.
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others facilitate the presence of competitive market makers as in-
termediaries who reduce timing costs. Unlike the open outcry sys-
tem, the screen-trading system does not require the expense and
the physical limits on participation of a central physical location; it
can accommodate more participants at less cost.
The International Stock Exchange (the "ISE"), formerly known
as the London Stock Exchange,'" and the NASD both operate
screen-based systems that are centralized, competitive market maker
markets. The ISE has replaced its physical trading floor with the
Stock Exchange Automated Quotation system ("SEAQ") for do-
mestic equities and the SEAQ International system for international
equity securities. In both systems, individual member firms can
register with the ISE' 91 as Registered Market Makers for any secu-
rity simply by giving the ISE notice. 192
 There is no limit on the
number of market makers for each security. Other members of the
ISE, and the public, subscribe to SEAQ data feeds that connect
them with the SEAQ system. Each market maker transmits its bid
and ask quotation for a specified number of lots (1,000 shares) of
each security. The SEAQ screen displays these quotations from all
market makers in the stock, highlighting the best quotation for each
stock in a bright yellow band, together with the day's volume. The
screen also displays the price and time at which the last trade
occurred. To accept a bid or offer displayed on the screen, a trader
must telephone the market maker to place an order. An insurance
scheme established by the Financial Services Act of 1986 reduces
security costs for participants.'" Settlement costs in the London
Dunaevsky, Globex and Models of Globex Regulation 7-12 (Dec. 21, 1989) (student paper
on file with author). The Globex system being introduced by the CME for futures contracts
will operate on the same principle.
199
 Prior to the removal of fixed commissions and other structural reforms in 1986, the
London Stock Exchange was a centralized specialist market. See N. POSER, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES REGULATION § 2.1.2, at 18-20 (1991). Exchange rules designated participants as
either 'jobbers," members who carry inventories of specific assigned stocks, or "brokers,"
members who take customer orders to jobbers for execution.
191 Rule 356.1, RULES OF INTERNATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE (1988) [hereinafter ISE]
(domestic SEAQ); ISE, supra, at Rule 334.1 (SEAQ International).
192 Registered market makers have the advantage of an exemption from the United
Kingdom's 1% stamp duty on stock transfers and of the right to borrow stock from other
ISE members. International Stock Exchange.' Wakey, wakey, ECONOMIST, May 20, 1989, at 88, 89,
col. 1.
199 The Investors Compensation Plan covers the first £30,000 of a loss and 90% of the
next £20,000. N. POSER, supra note 190, § 3.9.4, at 338; Waters, Stock Exchange alters its rules
as dust settles after the Big Bang, Fin. Times, Feb. 2, 1990. Because other exchanges offer more
protective schemes, competitive pressures are forcing the ISE to consider a supplemental
compensation program.
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equity market are still extremely high. Despite the use of the Tal-
isman computerized clearing system,'" ISE participants still rely on
physical delivery of certificates, which may take more than two
weeks. l95
The rules of the exchange, like those affecting the open outcry
system, structure the trading itself. First, market makers at all times
must have placed in SEAQ both firm bid and offer quotations for
at least one lot of 1,000. 196 Second, any trade executed by a market
maker must be reported immediately by entry into the SEAQ sys-
tem, 197 which in turn reports the trade on SEAQ screens. Unlike
the open outcry systems of the CME and CBOT, prearranged, after
hours and other off-exchange trading is not banned. Users of the
system, including market makers, can enter into transactions that
are not based on quoted prices on the system. In the case of large
transactions (over £100,000 in value), members do not have to
report the price until twenty-four hours later, although members
must report immediately both the deal and its size.' 98 Therefore,
not all deals must be exposed to the central market.
The NASDAQ system, inaugurated in 1971, was the model for
the SEAQ in many significant respects. 199 The NASDAQ system
facilitates the trading of any equity security listed with the NASD. 20°
H Regulation E-1, THE REGULATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE (1988);
N. POSER, supra note 190, § 2.2.4, at 59.
'95 Freeman, Taurus system expected to save £255m, Fin. Times, Mar. 10, 1990, at 24, coi.
1; Comment, International Securities Trading: The United States and Great Britain Develop Clearing
and Settlement Procedures for a New Age, 19 .CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 129, 144 (1988). The ISE is
developing a paperless clearance and settlement system, called Taurus. N. POSER, supra note
190, § 2.2.4, at 60-62; Waller, Stock Exchange prepares traders for paperless settlement, Fin. Times,
Mar. 10, 1990, at 8. The system is expected to save the domestic securities industry a total
of £255 million each year in settlement costs. Freeman, supra, at 24, col. I.
196 ISE, supra note 191, at Rule 357.1; ISE, supra note 191, at Rule 336.1. Market makers,
however, are not required to deal with other market makers at these quoted prices. ISE,
supra note 191, at Rule 357,1; see also DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING, FINANCIAL
SERVICES ACT OF 1986: TRADE PUBLICATION AND PRICE TRANSPARENCY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
STOCK EXCHANGE 8 (Apr. 1990).
L57 ISE, supra note 191, at Rule 371.3. This is not strictly accurate. The SEAQ divides
the domestic securities into three sets based upon their relative activity. Alphas are the most
actively traded, and all trades in these must be reported immediately by entry into ISE's
Topic, a computer information system. For beta stocks, market makers also provide contin-
uous and firm quotations, but trades need not be published immediately. The gammas are
the least active: prices quoted for these stocks are indicative only. TOPIC SERVICES, INC„
GLOBAL TRADING INFORMATION 7 (1987).
19' DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING, Supra note 196, at 8.
155 See R. TEWELES & E. BRADLEY, supra note 145, at 191-93.
20° To have its securities listed, an issuer must meet the requirements set forth in Part
II, 1, Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1803 (1991).
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More active NASDAQ-listed securities are also listed on the NAS-
DAQ National Market System (the )	 As with the ISE, the
NMS has no central physical trading area. Instead, NASD members
subscribe to the NASDAQ screen price quotation system. Members
execute trades by telephone calls to the market makers quoting the
desired price. Any NASD member may register as a NASDAQ
designated market maker, 202 and, unlike the ISE, the NASD does
not limit membership. As with the decentralized NASD OTC dealer
market, the NASD requires its screen quotation system participants
to settle trades through the National Securities Clearance Corpo-
ration and to meet financial requirements that increase security.
The NASD rules structuring trading are similar to those of the
ISE. Market makers must provide continuous bid-ask quotations in
their designated stocks. 203 The quotations must be firm offers to
buy or sell the security. 204 More stringent are the requirements that
a market maker's quotations be "reasonably related to the prevailing
market,"205 not in excess of the maximum allowable spreads, 206 and
not "lock" with the quotations of other market makers. 207 If the
NASD determines that these requirements are not met, it may
suspend the market maker's registration in one or all of its stocks. 208
The rules also require market makers, and many others, to report,
within ninety seconds after its execution, any transaction in a NMS
stock effected during trading hours. 209
2" In 1986, this was 2,695 out of 5,189 NASDAQ listed securities. NASD imposes higher
standards for NMS listing. Part III, §§.1-3, Schedule LI to NASD By-Laws, NASD Manual
(CCH) 11 1803 (1991).
402 The only condition is that members demonstrate that they meet the capital require-
ments of Exchange Act Rule 15c3—I, 17 C.F.R. §240.15c3 7 1 (1989). Registration is extremely
simple; the member simply indicates on its NASDAQ terminal that it intends to be a market
maker in a specified security.
2" Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, Part VI, § 2(a), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1819 (1991).
2°4
 Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, Part VI, § 2(b), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1819 (1991).
205 Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, Part VI, § 2(c), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1819 (1991).
206 Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, Part VI, § 2(d), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1819 (1991).
The NASD occasionally publishes the maximum allowable spreads, which are based on the
average quoted spreads. The greater the average spread, the greater the maximum allowable
spread. For example, at present, if the average spread is 1/4, the maximum is 1-1/2; and if
the average is 2, the maximum allowable spread is 3. Id.
257 Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, Part VI, § 2(e), NASD Manual (CCH) 111819 (1991).
A quotation locks with another if the bid is equal to or greater than the asked quotation of
another market maker or if the asked quotation is equal to or less than the bid quotation of
another. Id. § 2(e)(i)—(ii), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1819 (1991).
208 Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, Part VI, § 2(c)—(e), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1819
(1991).
269 Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, Part VI, § 2(a)(1), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1867
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In contrast to the open outcry markets, the ISE and NASDAQ
screen trading systems trade a very large number of assets, but each
asset is the subject of fewer transactions. The lower fixed costs of
screen technology both increase the possible number of market
participants and reduce the expense of maintaining the system.
Thus, despite less activity in each asset, the centralized system re-
duces counterparty search and price search costs. 21 ° Consequently,
the ISE and NASD members who wish to act as market makers in
providing timing cost reduction services can do so more cost effec-
tively, which facilitates the collective mechanism. On both the ISE
and the NASDAQ, government regulation simply bolsters the fi-
nancial and trading rules of the markets.
E. Centralized Specialist Markets
Many of the markets for equity securities operate with a spe-
cialist system of one form or another. Specialist markets differ from
the competitive market maker systems in that market rules force all
information on trading through a single market maker who per-
forms the counterparty search, price search and timing cost reduc-
tion functions. That person or company, the "specialist," is given a
favored position with respect to such information. The other market
participants cannot observe the entire order flow for an asset as
they can in the bulletin board or centralized market maker markets.
Instead, they must make their decisions based upon a single bid
and offer price announced by the specialist.
The New York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE"), the American
Stock Exchange (the "AMEX"), and regional American exchanges
such as the Midwest Stock Exchange (the "MSE") all designate 2 "
one of their members as the specialist for each listed security. There
are forty-nine specialists on the NYSE, and most specialists cover
(1991). Other NASD members must report all other trades weekly. Schedule D to NASD By-
Laws, Part XII, § 2(a)(3), NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 1867 (1991).
210 The ready availability of price quotations on computer screens make the NASD's
mark-up rule far less important in the NASDAQ market. See supra note 147 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of NASD's mark-up rule.
9 " On the NYSE, designation occurs pursuant to NYSE Rule 103, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
II 2103 (1989). The Market Performance Committee monitors the performance of specialists
on the NYSE. NYSE Rule 103A(a), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 9 2103A(a) (1991). The Committee
sets standards for performance and can initiate a Performance Improvement Action if a
specialist's performance falls below such standards. NYSE Rule 103A(b), N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2103A(b) (1991). There are fourteen posts on the NYSE, each peopled with several
specialists who run trading in a specified number of stocks.
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several stocks. 2 t 2 To be eligible for such designation, the member
must meet capital and other financial requirements.213 Specialists
are not exchange employees and, unlike the saitori on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, are entitled to trade for their own account. Spe-
cialists collect limit orders (orders to buy or sell at a specific price)
from floor brokers and traders active in the stock who mill around
the specialist's post, and records them in an "order book." Today,
for most active issues, this is a computer file. Only the specialists
have full knowledge of the contents of the order book, and Section
11(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, as well as exchange rules,
expressly forbids specialists from disclosing the contents of the or-
der book to any other person. 214 Thus, unlike - the centralized com-
petitive market maker markets, information about supply and de-
mand on specialist markets is transmitted only through the prices
quoted by specialists in response to requests from the floor.
In addition to acting as brokers between orders in their order
books, specialists also are market makers215 who may buy or sell the
stock for their own account. 216 In this capacity, specialists quote to
floor brokers their own bid-ask spread at which they are willing to
9" Automating Financial Markets: The human cost, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1990, at 20, col.
1. This article attributes the birth of the specialist system to one William Boyd:
Until some time towards the close of the nineteenth century, the NYSE's brokers
would scurry around the floor like worker ants, meeting at designated posts
where particular shares were traded. There, they would seek a buyer or their
seller, and vice versa. That was until William Boyd hurt his leg. A commission
broker like the rest of them, Boyd could no longer scurry. He positioned himself
by the Western Union post, agreed to look after other brokers' limit orders in
that share, and realized he could also make a bit of money trading for himself.
Id. More likely, less fortuitous economic factors lead to the invention of the specialist.
2 " NYSE Rule 104.20(1), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 112104.20(1) (1991) (be able to assume
position of 150 trading units); NYSE Rule 104.20(4), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2104.20(4)
(1991) (net liquid assets of the greater of $1,000,000 or 25% of its position requirements);
NYSE Rule 104.30, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2104.30 (1991) (regular reports to Federal
Reserve System); AMEX Rule 171, Am. Stock Ex. Guide ¶ 9311 (1991) (maintain in liquid
funds $600,000 or amount sufficient to assume position of 60 trading units in each of assigned
securities).
2" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. 78k(b) (1988). This rule is
incorporated in the rules of each exchange. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 115, N.Y.S.E. Guide (GCH)
¶ 2115 (1989); AMEX Rule 174, Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) ¶ 9314 (1991).
2" The specialists' third function is to act as an impartial auctioneer at the opening of
the exchange each day. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1033; BRADY REPORT, supra
note 141, at V1-5. The specialist reviews the orders that have arrived at the order book since
the close of trading the prior day and sets an opening price that attempts to clear the market.
216 This ability is important to the profits of specialists. Profits from such proprietary
trades in 1986 accounted for 64% of specialists' gross revenues on the NYSE. BRADY REPORT,
supra note 18, at V1-5.
September 19 9 1]	 TRADING FINANCIAL ASSETS	 1017
buy or sell assets. On such sales, the specialists receive no part of
the floor broker's commission, but must make their profit on their
inventory transactions. 217 The main advantage enjoyed by specialists
is exclusive access to the order book. This is an informationally
privileged position vis-a-vis other traders because specialists have
direct access to the order flow and can take advantage of market
shifts before they are apparent to nonspecialist participants.
Because of this exploitable informational advantage, specialist
activity is constrained by a set of practice rules mandated by statute.
In general, the specialist must "engage in a course of dealings for
his own account to assist in the maintenance, so far as practicable,
of a fair and orderly market." 218 Specialists cannot buy or sell stock
for their own account unless such transactions are necessary to
maintain the fair and orderly market. 219 Operationally, these rules
have been interpreted to permit, or even require to some extent,
specialists to buy or sell for their own account if there are no bids
or offers from the floor in the order book. 22° If there are bids or
offers, specialists may buy or sell for their own account only at
prices more advantageous for the customer than those in the
book.2" Such transactions, however, are only permitted if reason-
ably necessary to meet the vague requirement of maintaining a "fair
and orderly market. "222 Any other transactions by specialists for
their own account must be "stabilizing. "223 Finally, specialists may
2 " The SEC's Institutional Investor Study of 1971 discovered that "many specialists
earn[ed] rates of return far in excess of any conceivably competitive level. For example, the
average gross monthly rate of return before taxes, in active stocks, ranged from 88 to 190
percent, depending on the type of specialist." Smidt, Which Road to an Efficient Stock Market,
FIN. ANALYSTS J. Sept.-CICI. 1971, at 20, col. 2 8[ n.7 (Citing SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS STUDY 1914-28 (1971) (table X1I-24)). These returns
include floor brokerage fees and short-term capital gains.
21 " Exchange Act Rule 1 lb-1(a)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lb-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990).
21° Exchange Act Rule 1 lb-1(a)(2)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.116-1(a)(2)(iii) (1990).
220 See Macey & Kanda, supra note 18, at 1030. The specialist is not expected to support
a collapsing market. See id; BRADY REPORT, supra note 141, at 50.
221
	
Rule I04.10(5)(i), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2104.10(5)(i) (1987); AMEX Rule
170(d) and (e), Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) ¶ 9310 (1988); see R. TEWELES & E. BRADLEY,
supra note 145, at 173.
222 NYSE Rule 104.10(2)—(3), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2104.10(2)—(3) (1987); AMEX
Rule 170.01, Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9310.01 (1988).
223 Rule 104.12, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2104.12 (1990). Whether a transaction is
stabilizing depends on whether the specialist's total transactions in the designated stock meet
the tick test of Rule I 12(d)(3), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2112. If the prior reported price for
the shares purchased was down, a purchase is considered stabilizing. If the prior price was
up, a sale is considered stabilizing. Under Rule 104.12, 75% of all transactions for the
specialist's account, unconnected with its "fair and orderly market" obligation, must be
stabilizing. See Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb, supra note 104, at 129.
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not trade ahead of orders in the order book. 224 Specialists must
execute market orders and limit orders in the order book at better
prices ahead of their own transactions.
The effect of these and other rules is the same as the market
exposure rules in the commodity futures exchanges. With one ex-
ception, the block trade, 225 no trades can occur between members
unless they occur at the post, and in some cases through the spe-
cialists. No member other than a specialist, again with a limited
exception, 225 is permitted to make a market in any listed stock. 227
Moreover, a member acting on behalf of a client cannot cross or
execute the client's order with the order of another client unless
the member first exposes the order to the market at the post. 228 In
addition, the exchanges prohibit members from engaging in off the
exchange transactions for their own account in securities listed on
the exchange. 22° Although the SEC has partially invalidated this
224 This rule is analogous to the rule against front-running in the commodity futures
markets. See supra note 172.
225 Block trades, "which may not readily be absorbed by the market," NYSE Rule 127(a).
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2127 (1991), can be negotiated "upstairs." A block is a quantity of
stock greater than 10,000 shares or with a market value greater than $200,000 that is to be
transferred in a single transaction. NYSE Rule 127.10, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 9 2127.10
(1991). A block positioner who receives a block order must first explore depth of market on
the floor by checking with the specialist. NYSE Rule 127(a), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2127
(1991). If such exploration reveals that only a reasonable amount of the block will be lost to
floor participants at the agreed price, the positioner must fill such orders from the floor at
that price. lf, on the other hand, the positioner stands to lose an "excessive" amount of the
block, it may elect to announce the agreed price and state that the floor will not have an
opportunity to bid on the block. It must then wait a "reasonable" time for the floor partici-
pants to trade, after which it must execute the block at the agreed price. If the order was an
offer to sell, the positioner then must offer to the floor any stock from the block that it
intends to add to its position and, if there is none, must fill all orders from the floor at the
agreed price, up to the greater of 1,000 shares or 5% of the block's value, All trades must
be reported on the tape system. See generally Burdett Sc O'Hara, Building Blocks: An Introduction
To Block Trading, 11 J. BANK. & FIN. 193 (1987).
2" This is the competitive market maker exception. Under NYSE Rule I07A, N.Y.S.E.
Guide ¶ 2107A (1991), a member of the NYSE can register as a competitive market maker
and engage in transactions for its own account. Such registration is not limited to any
particular stock. If it so registers, it is subject to various obligations to help maintain a fair
and orderly market on the exchange. The major disadvantage of both competitive traders
and competitive market makers is that they do not have the same access to the order book
as does the specialist..
227 NYSE Rule 90, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2090 (1988).
"a NYSE Rule 76, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2076 (1990).
"9 NYSE Rule 390, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 9 2390 (1989); AMEX Rule 5, Am. Stock
Ex. Guide 9225 (1989). But see infra note 230 (Rule 19c-3). The General Accounting Office
recently recommended that the SEC should investigate whether this rule should be modified
or removed. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES TRADING: SEC ACTION NEEDED TO
ADDRESS NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM ISSUES 32 (Mar. 1990). Academic opinion is divided on
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rule, it remains in effect for the most actively traded securities. 23°
This forces members to place all their transactions, whether as
agents or principals, through the market structure of one of the
exchanges. The exchange rules also require all members to transmit
bid, offer, size, 23 ' and last-sale price and size information 252 to an
exchange employee on the floor. 2" The consolidation of this price
information gives participants the last price, current bid-ask spread
and current volume in each stock. 234
As in other markets, the regulations affecting trading in mar-
kets, as opposed to the relationship between the markets and inves-
tors, are largely bolstering ones. The SEC reviews rules proposed
by the exchanges and, for the most part, approves them with little
change. Although it has taken weak steps to force market making
competition on the exchanges, most regulation accepts the collective
mechanisms that have developed over time on the exchanges. 235
The SEC has not directly attacked the specialist system and its grant
of informational advantage.
The number of assets traded on the specialist markets is large
and, as on the ISE and NASDAQ, there are fewer transactions in
this issue. Compare Haddock & Macey, supra note 27, and Smidt, supra note 104, with Cohen,
Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb, supra note 104, at 129-31. See generally Stoll, Comments: 'An
Analysis of the Economic Justification far Consolidation in a Secondary Security Market' by Kalman J.
Cohen et al., 6 J. BANK. & FIN. 137 (1982); Parker, Off-Board Trading Restrictions, 13 REV. SEC.
REG. 919 (1980). A recent empirical study of Rule 19c-3, which partially removed NYSE
Rule 390, see infra note 230, found that the removal reduced the percentage bid-asked spread,
but increased the variance in the returns from trading. Cohen & Conroy, An Empirical Study
of the Effect of Rule 19c - 3, 33 J.L. & ECON. 277, 304-05 (1990).
2" Rule 19c-3, which became effective on July 18, 1980, abrogates rules such as NYSE
Rule 390 for all stocks listed on any exchange for the first time after April 26, 1979. 17
C.F.R. § 240,19c-3 (1990); see Haddock & Macey, supra note 27. Rule 19c-1, prohibits an
exchange from barring a member from acting, off the exchange, as an agent for a nonmem-
ber. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-1 (1989). The purpose of this rule was to permit members to execute
orders for customers through other exchanges, thereby encouraging the development of the
national market system envisioned by the Securities Act Amendments of 1975. Today, the
Integrated Trading System ("ITS") routes orders to the exchange offering the best price,
although it has not established a common order book. K. COHEN, S. MAIER, R. SCHWARTZ &
D. WrirrcomB, supra note 51, at 151.
231 NYSE Rule 60(c), N.Y.S.E. Guide 2060 (1989).
232 NYSE Rule 128A, N.Y.S.E. Guide 2128B (1991).
2" The SEC, in turn, requires that exchanges disseminate to quotation vendors all bids,
offers and sizes. Exchange Act Rule 11Ac1-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-1 (1989). This require-
ment is part of Congress' attempt to establish a national market system by consolidating
quotation information. Vendors collate the prices from all the exchanges and produce the
consolidated quotations. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7; Haddock
& Macey. supra note 27.
234 See R. TEWELES & E. BRADLEY, supra note 145, at 125.
232 See supra note 230.
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each asset than in the futures markets. Moreover, the nature of
these equity assets makes the price search reduction mechanism
more important. Finally, the number of participants is limited by
the requirement of membership on the exchanges. For the reasons
stated above, one would expect the substantial provision of collective
mechanisms to reduce the costs of counterparty and price search,
security and settlement. Under such conditions, however, timing
services are less likely to be provided by free competition for any
but the most heavily traded stocks. 236 Unlike the NASDAQ market,
where entry costs to the market making competition are low, the
limited number of memberships on the exchanges decreases the
pool of potential market makers. A competitive market maker sys-
tem is sustainable in a limited membership exchange only when the
volume of demand for the service is great. If that volume is low,
then only a specialist system can effectively reduce timing costs.
To set up the collective mechanism needed to reduce timing
costs, it might be in members' self-interest to designate one of their
number as a market maker in a stock, and to compensate that
member by giving the member an informational advantage. That
advantage would only harm the other members, however, when
they trade with the specialist for their own account. When trading
for customers, brokering members will still receive their commis-
sions, and the nonmember investors are still subsidizing the system.
Even for the nonmember investors, however, it may be advanta-
geous. Because investors desire maximum ability to convert their
assets into other forms of wealth, the size of the set of possible
alternative holdings is important. A market structure that offered
only ten stocks in which an investor could invest (because timing
costs in other stocks could not be collectively reduced) would be less
'36 For the most heavily traded stocks on the NYSE, there is effectively a competitive
market maker system:
The 'crowd' for those stocks, though substantially smaller than in the T-bond
futures market, is large enough to offer a competitive discipline to the Ex-
change's franchised "specialist," who in these particularly active markets, typi-
cally plays more the role of an auctioneer (and a commission collector) than a
market maker on personal account. .
Grossman & Miller, supra note 64, at 620. Floor traders, registered competitive traders, NYSE
Rules 111-112, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) iJ 2111-2112, and limit orders, see Cohen, Maier,
Schwartz & Whitcomb, Market Makers and the Market Spread: A Review of Recent Literature, 14
J. FIN. & QUAN. ANAL. 813 (1979), all compete with the specialist in making markets in stocks
such as Philip Morris, IBM, General Motors, General Electric and Citicorp. For more lightly
traded stocks, however, the specialist appears to be likely to have a monopoly position. I3eja
& Hakansson, supra note 2, at 158 ("In a centralized exchange, a trader designated as a
'market-making specialist' enjoys undeniable monopoly power").
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desirable to an investor concerned with portfolio diversification than
a market structure that provided 500 stocks. In the financial futures
markets, where additional futures products would not add much to
portfolio diversification,237 there is no need for cross-subsidization
to support markets for particular assets that attract less volume. To
the extent that market participants demand a reasonably diverse set
of assets into which to convert, the joint benefit may exceed the cost
of maintaining a specialist system.
F. Changing Factors and Market Structures
The different market structures analyzed above reflect the col-
lective mechanisms that have developed for the secondary trading
of particular assets, given the relative costs and benefits of each
mechanism. The demand for transactions, the number of partici-
pants in the markets and the nature of the assets determine the
structure of these collective mechanisms. As is clear from the above,
however, these mechanisms are in flux; in several markets, there
are new collective mechanisms vying with the old ones for domi-
nance. In the foreign exchange market, for example, Reuters has
introduced a centralized quotation system, 2" and is even attempting
to introduce a screen trading system."9 Likewise, for government
securities, one inter-dealer broker is operating a centralized price
quotation system.24° Even in the stock markets, competitive market
making systems are competing with specialist systems on the New
York Stock Exchange and through the third market."'
These changes are due to changes in the number of market
participants, the demand for transactions, and the nature of the
assets. In turn, technological change and international financial
deregulation have driven many of the changes in these factors.
Technological changes that reduce the costs of participation in-
crease the number of participants in each market.242 In particular,
237 Stock index futures provide a ready-made portfolio of equity securities. Nonsyste-
matic interest rate risk can be well diversified by use of Treasury-rate, Eurodollar-rate and
foreign currency based futures contracts. Finally, by using foreign currency futures contracts,
investors can diversify their "political" risks.
"8 See supra no 109 and accompanying text.
In In the summer of 1989, Reuters introduced a new trade execution system, Dealing
2000. This system will allow foreign currency traders around the world to enter orders, and
will match those orders automatically. Automating Financial Markets; The human factor, ECON-
OMIST, Mar. 10, 1990, at 20, col. 1. This system is not yet operational.
44° See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 236.
412 See Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 1086.
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advances in telecommunications have broadened potential partici-
pation in all financial markets. Moreover, such changes reduce many
of the costs of the collective mechanisms. Centralized price quota-
tion systems that previously required a physical presence can now
be conducted through telecommunications lines. Finally, changes in
information technology can reduce some asset quality determina-
tion costs.
International deregulation of financial markets increases the
number of participants, as well as the demand for transactions. 243
The type of deregulation that has the greatest effect is that which
removes limits on individuals' investment choices. For example, the
liberalization of Japanese regulations regarding the operation of
their banks and other financial institutions has brought a whole
group of new players into the secondary markets. Similar changes
have occurred in the rules restricting assets in which Japanese na-
tionals can invest. These changes have freed up substantial capital,
which flowed into the American government securities and stock
markets in the 1980s. 244 As these changes continue, the economizing
collective mechanisms will continue to evolve.
IV. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE
MECHANISMS
As suggested earlier, government regulation is merely one of
several possible devices by which markets provide a collective mech-
anism to reduce the costs of transferability. The use of government
regulation should depend on its comparative advantage over other
devices. As the preceding review of market structures indicates,
government regulation appears in situations in which the number
of participants is large and diverse. Moreover, where it does exist,
it functions to bolster existing market rules. Government regulation
may increase the severity of sanctions for rule violations and may
bring the additional resources of the government enforcement
mechanisms to bear on the violators. Major roles of government
regulation include ensuring the financial health of market partici-
pants and supporting the markets' private rules that require their
participants to contribute to price search costs. Many of the other
collective mechanisms that reduce the costs of transferability are
provided privately.
24] See generally S. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF THE WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS
(1990).
241 See id. at 108-10.
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This analysis is consistent with the comparative cost argument.
Whether a collective mechanism that reduces transfer costs will
emerge depends on the cost of providing that mechanism and the
demand for it. Many of the mechanisms are structured such that
the market is able to charge those who benefit from the services for
their allocable share of the costs of the mechanisms. An information
service that collects, collates and transmits quotation and price in-
formation to market users is able to limit access to the services to
those who pay for it. For example, most of the markets have de-
veloped ways, albeit different, for reducing settlement and timing
costs. Moreover, the NYSE, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the ISE,
and the NASDAQ systems collect fees from participants and pri-
vately provide the centralized mechanism that reduces counterparty
search and price dissemination costs. 245
Such private rules and their enforcement, however, may be
quite costly; it may not be so simple to force the beneficiaries of the
collective mechanism to pay their share. First, where the participants
in a market are numerous and diverse, private rules may be difficult
to enforce privately. The NYSE, the ISE, and the NASD all have
large and diverse memberships that often have conflicting interests.
Each market's centralized price search mechanism, for example, not
only reduces price and counterparty search costs, but also provides
participants with equilibrium prices that summarize asset quality
information. Even if the collective mechanism can exclude firms
from access to those prices unless they pay a fee, the mechanism
also depends on members' contributions to the information pooling.
If only a portion of the members transact within the market struc-
ture, the collective reduction of transacting costs may be less than
optima1.246 Those members transacting outside the market structure
would not be making their allocable contribution to the cost of the
2" The NYSE has fought hard to establish its property right in the price information
generated by trades on the exchange. See J. Mulherin, J. Netter & J. Overdahl, supra note
92, at 20-59.
2" In such situations, individual participants have strong incentives to take advantage
of the consolidated price and asset quality information without exposing their transactions
to the market. Assuming they can solve the timing and counterparty problems, participants
can trade directly with each other without going through the central market structure, and
large houses may even be able to cross trades in-house. See Cohen, Maier, Schwartz &
Whitcomb, supra note 104, at 124. If the number of defectors is small enough, the quality of
the centralized price information will not be materially diminished, but no individual trader
would have an incentive to continue to contribute to the central price. Cf. Grossman &
Stiglitz, supra note 93, at 904 (efficient market paradox: if prices are efficient, no one person
has incentive to gather information).
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market. Moreover, detection of such off-exchange trading is quite
difficult. For this reason, government regulation that increases both
the possible sanctions for violations of private rules of the
exchange247
 and the probability of the sanctions being imposed 248
may increase the likelihood of compliance.
Even putting this special problem aside, private markets, in
order to enforce their rules effectively and preserve the benefits of
the collective mechanism, would have to develop enforcement in-
stitutions that would rival similar governmental units. If public
enforcement of these rules would be less costly than setting up
private mechanisms, it would likely replace or supplement private
enforcement. It may be that if the rules of market organizations
were enforced by federal regulators, who have civil and criminal
sanctions at their disposal, the social as well as the private costs of
these market structures could be reduced.
This argument is consistent with the economic theory of reg-
ulation, 249 and inconsistent with the older view that regulation is
necessary to correct the "unfortunate allocative consequences of
[some] market failure."250 Organized groups of market participants
who wish to take advantage of the government's ability to provide
enforcement of market rules may demand and obtain regulation of
financial markets. In all cases, such regulation constitutes a wealth
transfer from one group to another. 25 ' Absent a discriminating
247
 Violation of exchange rules subjects the violator to suspension from exchange mem-
bership. Because of government regulation, such violations can also expose the violator to
suspension as a broker-dealer, and consequently from the securities business completely. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1988).
2441
 The SEC's Division of Market Regulation helps uncover trading rule violations. J.
Cox, R. HILLMAN & a LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 21
(1991). Although it usually acts on individual complaints, the Division has access to exchange
trading information from which it could ascertain some types of violations. "[T]he '34 Act
has always provided for a certain degree of SEC oversight of [self-regulatory organization]
oversight." Id. at 1192. Likewise, the presence of the CFTC increases the likelihood of
detection of trading rule violations in the futures markets. Although it has limited resources,
the CFTC monitors trade practices at the commodities exchanges and is seeking to upgrade
the audit on paper trails for transactions. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FUTURES
MARKETS: STRENGTHENING TRADE PRACTICE OVERSIGHT 21-23, 39-44 (Sept. 1989).
2" Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With An Application
to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 313 (1987) (insider trading regulations
benefit market professionals); see also Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
EcoN. & MGMT. SDI. 3 (1971); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L.
& ECON. 211 (1976).
25° Peltzman, supra note 249, at 213 (presumption that "what is basically at stake in
regulatory processes is a transfer of wealth").
2" See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 635-42 (mandatory disclosure regulation
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users' fee, government regulation, paid for by the public at large,
increases the wealth of those market participants who enjoy the cost
reductions brought about by the collective mechanism.252 Despite
this wealth transfer, however, it still may be that one effect of such
regulatory action is to reduce the total social cost of transactions.
The difficult policy question is whether a particular regulation is
desirable in this sense.
V. CONCLUSION
Markets for the secondary trading of financial assets, like all
markets, are social institutions that exist because they organize be-
havior to benefit the users of the market. In order to be beneficial,
these markets must reduce the costs of transacting below what users
would incur without them. The important issue is not whether some
idealized notion of a "free market" is superior to some idealized
notion of "regulation." It is whether a particular market structure
"economizes" most thoroughly given the nature of the assets, the
demand for transacting and the available cost-reducing technology.
In this calculus, when market structures are faced with difficult
commons problems, it may be that government regulation is the
best "economizing" technology.
is "a form of relief legislation for professional traders"); Haddock & Macey, supra note 249,
at 328-32 (insider trading regulations benefit market professionals).
252 Gilson and Kraakman's discussion of derivative trading and insider trading regulation
illustrates this point. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 629-34.
